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Résumé
En utilisant l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE)
comme étude de cas, ce mémoire présente un modèle théorique pour saisir
l’institutionnalisation et les transformations des organisations internationales (01).
Ce modèle s’appuie sur le concept de manipulation stratégique des normes
récemment repris par frank Schimmelfenning. En présentant un modèle qui
analyse les différentes phases de la construction et des trajectoires de
développement d’une organisation intemationale, ce mémoire démontre
l’importance cté des luttes de pouvoir et d’influence au sein des 01 qui sont
reflétées dans les processus d’action rhétorique des Etats membres. Dans le cas de
l’OSCE, différentes conceptions des règles, principes et valeurs de l’Acte final
d’Helsinki ont mené les Etats participants à des luttes rhétoriques qui ont eu pour
effet, dans une perspective de dépendance au sentier, aux conséquences actuelles,
soit une crise politique ouverte menaçant la survie de l’organisation à court terme.
Mots clés: Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE),
sécurité européenne, organisations internationales, construction institutionnelle,
action rhétorique
Abstract
Using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a case
study, this article presents a model for understanding both the institutional design
and the subsequent transformations of international organizations (1GO). This
model derives from a body of literature on the strategic manipulation of norms
most recently exemplified by the work offrank Schimmelfenning. By presenting
a model that takes into account the different phases of the life cycle of an 1GO,
this paper argues that the key point to our understanding of IGOs lies in the
struggle for power and influence that is reflected in the processes of shaming and
framing, under the notion of rhetorical action, by members states. In the case of
the OSCE, different conceptions of the rules and principles of the Helsinki Final
Act led the participating states in rhetorical arguments that culminated in what,
following a path dependent process, I label as unintended consequences, namely
the actual political crisis and stalemate within the organization. Although this
model more clearly applies to security institutions or other institutions within the
realm of high politics and gives us a detailed understanding of their internal
mechanisms, use of this model could also provide with better knowledge of non
security related institutions where a consensus does flot exist on the normative
foundations within the organization.
Key Words: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
European security, international organizations, institutional design, rhetorical
action
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The OSCE and the institutionalization ofsecurity in Europe (1990-2006)
The Helsinki Final Act was signed on August 1, 1975 which marked the
birth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The
particularity of this forum was that it spanned across both the communist and
capitalist blocs. During the Cold War, the CSCE seemed to achieve onty limited
results as the tensions and opposition between both blocs appeared to limit the
importance of this forum for fostering security cooperation. The Belgrade and
Madrid follow-up conferences of 1977 and 1984, respectively, confirmed the
limited prospects of cooperation within this dialogue forum. However, despite
these difficulties the CSCE achieved its goal of maintaining doser relations
between the two blocs in security related issues. Thus on the surface, a
preliminary assessment would present the CSCE as a useful, but marginal, tool to
deepen security cooperation between the East and the West during the Cold War.
Yet recent studies (Thomas 2001; Evers et al 2005) on the CSCE during
the Cold War have dernonstrated that this organization actually played an
important role in the dernise ofcommunism. As such, revisiting the history ofthe
CSCE with new empirical evidence leads to a new understanding of its
achievements and role in the rapprochement of the two blocs. However, the
steady decline of the C-OSCE’ after the CoId War has been evident in this new
security landscape. How then can we explain the relative failure of the OSCE in
the 1990s compared to its unheralded but vital role during the Cold War?
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was renamed the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. This paper vi11 use the term OSCE to refer to the
organization in general and the term CSCE wilI only be used when referring to the specific period
between 1975 and 1990.
2Two principal approaches to answer this question can be found. The first
argument (Hong 1997) considers the rules, norms and principles within the
organization and presents thc CSCE as a security regirne in formation that was
well-suited for the Cold War environment, but argues that its set of rules, norms
and principles were flot adapted to the new security environment in the post-Cold
War 1990s. The second argument considers the interests ofthe participating states
within the organization and concludes that the European Union, the United States
and Russia, the main actors, were not very interested, but for very different
reasons, to use this forum to promote their security interests. This argument
derives from classical interpretation of realism of which John Mearsheimer’s
writings are particularty close to this second interpretation (1990, 1994).
The first argument can be countered when we look at the empirical
evidence. The relative failure of the OSCE has to be understood in different
stages. It is flot until 1995-1996 that the OSCE begins to lose its relevance. Before
that, it was somewhat successful in steering the participating states in this new
security environment and to build the normative foundations of this environment
(Milanova 2005; Hoynck 1996).
The second argument actually paves the way for more questions. If the
main actors did flot have any important interests within the CSCE, why did it
survive? Why was it flot abandoned when its purpose, to foster cooperation across
the two blocs and to serve as a forum for dialogue between the East and the West,
was accomplished?
3Here, three different answers can again be differentiated. First, some have
argued that institutions neyer die, and that, amongst other elements, bureaucratic
resistance shapes the battleground and forces the main actors to flot abandon
completely the organization (Strange 199$). Sorne have argued that the
disintegration ofthe Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the conflicts that emerged
ofthese successive disintegrations, have given a new set of objectives and targets
for the organization (Héraclides 1993, Kemp 1998). f inally, some have argued
that the main actors eventually lost interest in the organization, explaining its slow
decline afier 1995-1996 (Ghébali 2002; Mlyn 2003; Hopmann 2000). This last
argument is usually explained by presenting the European security architecture
after the Cold War. With the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU) in this security landscape, the OSCE was
gradually lefi at the margin ofthis institutional dynamic (Ghébali et al 2004; Plate
1999).
Again, these explanations only complicate our puzzle. How then can we
explain the evolution of the main actors’ position regarding the OSCE and their
security interests within it? How can we explain the dual influence of the
international environment and the changing security dynamics on one side and of
the main actors’ interests on the other side? More importantly, how do these
factors account for the transformation of the OSCE afier the Cold War from a
security forum to an almost fulI-fledged international organization?
In short, what accounts for the transformation ofthe OSCE and its relative
but steady decline in the 1990s?
4This is the objective of this paper: to understand the factors that shaped
this transformation and explain how exactly they influenced this transformation.
This project bas two related goals: to provide an analytical framework that offers
a sufficiently complete and broad understanding of the factors behind the OSCE
transformation and to presents an analysis and a detailed description of this
empirical transformation.
This research follows a simple design. First, a literature review is done in
order to assess what we know about the OSCE, what we don’t know and what we
want to know. This literature review is divided in two parts.
The first aspect of this literature review consists of looking at theoretical
explanations ofthe OSCE after the Cold War. This literature review builds on the
review essay on the state of the art of OSCE studies by Michaet Merlingen
(2003). Merlingen reviewed four books published in 2001 conceming the OSCE
and discusses the lack of theoretical studies on the OSCE. He states that most
research on the OSCE has been concerned with practical and empirical
assessments ofthe OSCE, or in other words, mostly descriptive research. He then
makes an argument toward refocusing the study ofthe OSCE toward theoretically
informed analysis of the OSCE. This part of the literature review thus seeks to
find what has becn done theoretically about the OSCE and provide an up-to-date
perspective on OSCE studies.
5The second part of the literature review departs from specific OSCE
related research. This section reviews the literature on the formation, design and
impacts of international institutions in international relations theories. It uses the
rationaÏist-constructivist divide as a starting point and tries to give a summary of
different explanations of internationaL organizations in the world.
Afier this literature review which consists ofthe first chapter ofthis thesis,
a conceptual ftamework is developed to explain the evolution of the OSCE afier
the Cold War. This model is based around a classic debate: the structure versus
agency divide in international relations (Carlsnaes 1992; Wendt 1992). This
model seeks to explain the different impacts of structure and actors (understood
mainly as the great powers within the OSCE) and to account for both the design
and evolution ofthe OSCE after the Cold War. Based around a rationalist setting,
this model explains the design and evolution of the OSCE by evaluating the
influence of the great powers within the OSCE (france, Germany, Great-Britain,
Russia and United States) on this evolution and by determining the amount of
constraints, understood as structural factors limiting the choices of these actors,
present on them. The central explanatory argument lies within this actor-centric
explanation where the great powers act according to their own national interests
and where international organizations are viewed as a mean for the advancernent
ofthese national interests, limited only partially by structural explanations.
The framework used here is a variant of Schimmelfenning’s (2001; 2003)
interpretation of Goffmann’s sociological work. It starts with rationalist
assumptions and then takes into account the influence of the changing normative
6environment and the use by states of the liberal-democratic norms to shape and
constrain (with framing and shamïng techniques) other actors to follow a course
of action that reflects the interests and position ofthe first actor.
The main hypothesis ofthis project is two-fold. This project flrst argues
that the transformation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe has been mostly influenced by the liberal democratïc norms present in the
Western (or euro-Atiantic) security community. However, these norms were not
integrated as part ofa logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 199$), and thus
flot internalized by the East European and post-Soviet countries. Instead, it is the
manipulative, strategic and rational use of these norms — through the concept of
rhetoricai action - that accounts for the way the OSCE has redesigned itseif.
The second argument that this project deveiops is that this particular
process of institutionalization leU inevitabiy — in a path-dependent process (Thelen
et al 1992, Pierson 2000) — to the actual crisis and the stagnation of this
organization, the main consequence of its internai evoiution that we see today.
Thus, the deiiberate and strategic use of the iiberat democratic norms by
the different participating states within the OSCE flot oniy shaped its
institutionalization process, but also had the consequence of recreating new
dividing unes within this organization and in turn providcs the background for the
ongoing crisis within the OSCE.
7The independent variable is the behaviours ofthe members’ states and the
dependent variable is the change within the organization. The normative
environment serves as an intervening variable to understand the way the
behaviour ofmembers’ states is shaped.
After these two chapters, the literature review and the conceptual
framework, it will be possible to evaluate empirically the validity of the
conceptual framework.
The third chapter analyzes the national interests of the states within the
OSCE and the outcornes of the OSCE evolution after the Cold War. This will be
donc by taking into account the secondary literature on different elements of the
evolution ofthe OSCE, but mainly by using archives documents from the OSCE.
Using these archives, the evolution of the OSCE is divided in several phases or
critical junctures. In the archives, the focus is on the documents that highlight the
roles and positions played by the great powers at five key points of the evolution
of the OSCE afier the Cold War. f irst, this section looks at the adoption of the
Charter of Paris in 1990 and the process of institutionalization ofthe OSCE within
the Helsinki Summit (1992). The second and third moments will look at the
adoption of the Charter for European Security in 1999, starting with the Security
Model discussions around 1995-1996. The fourth moment will be the ongoing
budget crisis that has created more obstacles since 2001. The fifth moment that
will be studied is the recent panel of eminent persons on transforming the OSCE
(2005) and the debate concerning the role ofthe OSCE afier its 30th anniversary.
$These moments cover the entire institutionalization process that the OSCE
has undergone since the end of the Cold War. First, it follows the OSCE at
different moments from 1990 to 2006. Second, it addresses issues that cover
different roles and functions of the OSCE: human rights and democratization,
military aspects and econornic and environrnental issues. Third, it looks at events
that are both inward looking (that is that they involve the structure of the
organization itself) and outward looking (that is that it involves dealing with
specific aspects of security in Europe, for example the field missions).
It will then be possible to assess the merits and limits of the conceptual
framework used here. The concluding rernarks of this paper evaluate the model
using the findings made in this study, highlight the relevance ofthis research both
for students of the OSCE and students of international organizations and seek to
push the research agenda further.
9Chapter I
Merits and limits of OSCE studies
The first chapter of this dissertation focuses on two separate (but related)
literature review on the OSCE and the influence of international organizations in
general. More specifically, the objective of this literature review is to assess the
current state of the affairs concerning the study of the OSCE and how this relates
to the actual debates in international relations concerning the design and the
effects of international organizations. This in turn will be used to develop a
relevant analytical framework, in chapter two, for the study ofthe evolution ofthe
OSCE after the Cold War (1990-2006). However, this chapter begins with an
overview ofthe OSCE since 1975 in order to provide a ftamework ofreference to
this study.
Afler this brief introduction, a classification, in section I, of the relevant
literature on the OSCE is done: descriptive studies, prescriptive studies and
constructivist-oriented studies. Then, the second section focuses on expanding the
discussion on the state of the affairs within the OSCE by engaging a debate on
theoretical grounds. More precisely, this section builds on recent comments by
Michael Merlingen (2003) who mentioned that studies on the OSCE tend to be
undertheorized and remain mainly on empirical and descriptive grounds. He
underlined two key elements in his discussion. First is the notion that this
empirical bias has limited the analytical power of recent OSCE studies:
Much of the research on the C/OSCE is informed by an
empiricist conception of knowledge production that long ago feli out
of favour in mainline international relations scholarship. Research
proceeds as if the world could be known as it really is, i.e., as if
observational predicates were isomorphs of sensual objects rather than
theoretically constituted elements of inquiry. (Merlingen 2003 ; $1)
and also “This Jack of theoretical orientation limits the ability of
analysts to appreciate the interpretative possibilities in the empirical
material, restricting them in what they are able to notice and say about
the organisation. (Merligen 2003 ; 71)
The second element is that more research based on international relations
theories is needed to gain a better understanding ofthe OSCE: “The more general
point I wanted to make is that, irrespective of the theoretical perspective chosen
by scholars, there is a need for a theoretical turn in OSCE studies.” (Merligen
2003 ; 81)
However, Merlingen’s article deals only with a very small sample of
OSCE literature (his review consists of four books, all published in 2001 : Ghebali
and Warner ; Kemp ; Thomas ; Zellner and Lange). As such, before accepting
his conclusions, an in-depth Jiterature review needs to be accomplished in order to
gain a broader perpective of OSCE studies. The second section reviews research
that are theory-driven or that make a substantive use of theory in order to analyze
the OSCE. This section also finds that, with only a few exceptions, much of the
theoretically engaged work on the OSCE uses a constructivist framework.
The third section differs in scope from the previous literature review of
this chapter. Instead of reviewing studies that concentrate on the OSCE, this
section deals with the Jiterature on the current theoretical debates about the design
and the effects of international organizations. It thus offers a broader view on how
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one might use c4fferent theories in order to study the OSCE. As such, it seeks to
offer a balance to the dominant constructivist trend within OSCE studies. It
proceeds as follows. First, an overview of the three main theoretical schools of
thought in international relations’ insights on international organizations is made.
Then, a few examples of theoretical framework are analyzed. finally, a review of
recent attempts at bridge-building between the rationalist-constructivist divide and
an assessment ofthis subfield is made.
A brief description of the OSCE
Before providing a literature review on the OSCE, both in empirical and
theoretical grounds, it is essential to define the OSCE and its main evolution since
its creation in 1975. Here, three main phases ofthe process are discussed. First,
the origins of the CSCE (1954-1975) are sketched, complemented with a
description of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Second, the period between 1975
and 1989, consisting of the follow-up meetings and the so-called Helsinki process
are described. F inally, the consequences of the dernise of communism on the
CSCE (especially the Charter of Paris and the second Helsinki conference,
respectively in 1990 and 1992) are analyzed. A final part of this overview puts
forward a definition ofthe OSCE’s comprehensive agenda for security in Europe.
The origins ofthe CSCE: 1954-19 75
The origins of a paneuropean conference are usually traced back to a 1954
Soviet proposal to confirm the end of the Second World war and the borders
resulting from it. The Molotov project vas rejected by the West on the basis that
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it would undermine the NATO alliance and that it did flot fully include the United
States (which would have only been observers). This initial rejection of the
proposai by the West led to a period of hibernation and, in the 1960s, to a series of
propositions from the Eastern bloc to develop a paneuropean conference on
security cooperation across the two blocs. following the Harmel report on the role
ofNATO towards Eastem Europe in 1967, this idea ofa paneuropean conference
on security and cooperation was steadily making its way across the divided
Europe. With the Cold War reaching a détente period, this idea becarne even more
interesting for both sides. In 1970, the foundations of the conference were laid
when the Soviet agreed to several conditions concerning Germany and the
participation of the United States as full participant and also when negotiations
concerning arrns reductions were reached between the two superpowers. Thus in
1972, the tasks of organizing a paneuropean conference on security and
cooperation began in Dipoli, near Helsinki (Maresca 1985; Ghébali 1989; Bloed
1990, 1993; Rotfeld 1996).
Negotiated in three phases between 1972-1975, the Helsinki negotiations
between the 35 countries of both the Eastern and Western bloc faced many
obstacles and challenges and the resuit is an hybrid compromise between the two
blocs. At the end of the negotiation stage however, this loosely organized forum
between participating states from the East and West with follow-up meetings
during the Cold War was viewed at the time as complete victory for the USSR2. In
this view, the West accepted the principles ofthe inviolability ofborders and only
got empty declarations and principles concerning human rights. But between 1975
2 This view was reflected in newspaper headiines urging the president ofthe United States Gerald
ford flot to sign the final act : “Jerry don’t go” (Wall Street Journal editorial July 21, 1975, taken
from Thomas 2001)
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and the end ofthe Cold War, the dissidents in the Soviet bloc used the Helsinki
Final Act, and especially Principle VII ofthe Decalogue concerning human rights,
to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. This so-called Helsinki effect,
which has played an important role in the demise ofcomrnunisrn, has been largely
documented both at the macro level and the micro level.
The Helsinki fmal Act was signed in Helsinki, August 1, 1975. It is
separated in three Baskets. Basket one comprises the politico-military dimension
including peacefut resolution mechanisms, the concept of a cooperative security
and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Basket two links the
participants in the economic and scientific fields. Basket thrce is the human rights
aspect of this final Act. Noteworthy is Principle VII of the fmal act that deals
with “Respect for human rights and fundamental fteedoms, including the freedom
ofthought, conscience, religion and belief’. (Final Act, OSCE Documentation)
The Helsinki process 1975-1989
Between August 1975 and 1989, follow-up meetings to the CSCE were
organized. A brief surnmary ofthe input and output ofthese follow-up meetings is
sufficient to present an overview of the achievements of the CSCE during the ebb
and flow of the détente. The first follow-up meeting in Belgrade (1977-78)
achieved liftle resuits due to the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union
(regarding their interventions in Africa) and the United States (with the new
Carter doctrine on human rights) (Ghébali 1989). The 1984 Madrid meeting was
more successful and started the negotiations on disarmament that led to new
fora detaited account, sec Daniel Thomas, The Helsinki effect, Princeton University 2001
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Security Confidence Building Measures (Ghébali 1989; Bloed 1990, 1993). The
final meeting of the CSCE during the Cold War tvas the Vienna Meeting that
lasted 3 years, 1986-1989. This final meeting served as an open dialogue forum
during the final years of the Cold War and made more advances in the domain of
arrns control and human rights dimension (Lehne 1991; Btoed 1990, 1993).
Afler the demise ofcomnzunism 0990-1992,)
The final phase of this overview starts with the demise of communism and
ends with the Second Helsinki Summit in 1992. In 1990, the CSCE played a
prominent role to mark the end ofthe Cold War by signing the Charter of Paris for
a new Europe which, in the spirit of euphoria of the time, reiterated the Helsinki
Final Act principles and called for the creation of a new Europe, free, democratic
and guided by the norms stated 15 years ago in Helsinki “The era of
confrontation and division of Europe has ended.” and also “Ours is a time for
fiilfihling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades”
(Charter of Paris, 1990)
However, the events did not unfold according to this new vision of Europe
described in the Charter and in 1992, when the second Helsinki Summit started,
the mood was grim, conflicts had erupted once again in Europe. Division, once
again, was there. As such, the CSCE’s role and mandate that seemed to have been
fulfihled in 1990 with the end ofthe Cold War proved to be stiil relevant4. These
dramatic changes in the context of European security enabled the CSCE to
redesign itself from a Cold War forum to an almost full-fledged intemational
‘ I thank Walter Kemp for making this point.
organization capable of dealing with new threats and new conceptions of security
afier the Coid War.
This institutionalization process was reflected both on a political and
operational levels.5 The new politicai will to provide security in this new
environmcnt of conflicts (both ethnic in the Balkans and internai in the post
Soviet countries) made possible the development of a permanent organization
with a secretariat, different bodies acting either on behaif of the member states
(the Permanent Council and its previous incarnations) or directly for the
organization (the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika) and annual meetings at the
ministerial leveis and aU hoc summits at the head of state level. On the operationai
ievel, the OSCE developed new structures based on the three dimensions of the
Final Act to cope with the new emerging threats. The High Commissioner on
National Minorities was established in 1992 to provide support to participating
states in rcsoiving ethnic tensions or conflicts. Other structures were aiso created:
the Conflict Prevention Center, the Office for Dernocratic Institutions and Human
Rights, the Coordinator for Economic and Environrnental issues (OSCE
Documentation).
A conceptuat definition ofthe CSCE/OSCE
As can be seen from this chronoiogical description ofthe CSCE during the
Cold War, the CSCE’s agenda for security can be summarized as comprehensive
and cooperative and the development of the CSCE from a forum to an
for a general overview ofthe structure ofthe OSCE, see the OSCE chart available online at
http://www.osce.orpub1ications/sg/2OD6/O 1 / 13554 53 fr.pdf
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international organization is closeÏy linked to the chain of evdnts between 1975
and 1992. This final part highlights the key elements ofboth these aspects.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was renamed the OSCE in 1995 at
the Budapest Summit) has become the largest regional security organization with
566 participating states from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including the United
States. Created during the détente years of the Cold War, the Helsinki fmal Act
formed the basis of the CSCE. This document enshrined three sets of principles:
on human rights, on politico-military affairs and on economic, scientific and
environmental issues. As such this compromise between the Soviet bloc (which
gained the principle of the integrity of borders and territories) and the West
(which forced the inclusion of human rights issues in the Final Act) was seen as
part of the political process of the Cold War and the détente. (OSCE
Documentation)
The foundations of the CSCE are its comprehensive agenda and its global
reach. Comprehensive is understood both in terms of the wide scope of security
issues (hum an rights, economic, scientific and environmental issues, politico
militaiy aspects) and the links it tries to make between these three dimensions. Its
global reach and cooperative aspects underlie the objective of the CSCE to be a
forum of dialogue between the Eastern bloc and Western bloc and its objective to
include as many participants as possible (thus its rapid expansion following the
6 Montenegro vas admitted to the OSCE on June 22, 2006 following the referendum for the state
status ofMontenegro on May 21, 2006 and signed the Helsinki Final Act on September 1, 2006.
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break-up of the Soviet Union and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (OSCE
Documentation).
To conclude this overview of the evoÏution of the C/OSCE, it is essential
to put the institutionalization of this organization against the chain of events that
occurred between 1975 and 1992. While the OSCE mirrored the events that led to
the end of the Cold War, the OSCE managed flot only to be a reflection of these
historical evolutions but also to be a part of these changes and to foster
cooperation and dialogue.
C1assi1ing the literature on the OSCE
Before it is possible to understand the relationship between theory and the
OSCE literature, it is essential to frame and classify the different categories of
OSCE studies. Three main approaches to the OSCE are found in the literature
descriptive studies, prescriptive studies and constructivist oriented studies.
Category I: Descriptive studies
The flrst category consists of research that simply review what is the
OSCE or what does the OSCE do (or did) in a particular domain. Its main
objective is to provide information on the OSCE. It answers questions ofthe what,
who, when and how type. It is empirically oriented and is what Merlingen argues
against doing (2003, 71). Consistent with the findings of Merligen, this category
1$
is the rnost important quantitatively. It can be subdvided in five branches
according to the aspect of the OSCE that is studied I - the structures and
different institutions ofthe OSCE, 2 - the relations between the OSCE and other
international organizations, 3 - the evolution ofthe mandates ofthe OSCE, 4
- the
impacts and importance of the three OSCE dimensions and 5 - the role of
participating states within the OSCE. The first branch can then be subdivided
again in five sections 1 — the institutionalization of the OSCE, 2 — long term
missions, 3 — summits and councils, 4 — High Commissionner on National
Minorities (HCNM), 5 — Confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and
the military-political documents (the CFE and the Open skies Treaty) .
On a qualitative note however, this kind of analysis differs widely, with
sorne work providing only an often vague and superficial understanding of the
OSCE. In its most relevant and interesting form, research in this category enables
the reader to learn the necessary information on certain specific aspects of the
OSCE. This kind of research gives references on key documents not always
available, or at least not easily available, mainly officiai documents from the
OSCE archives. These documents also provide excellent background summary
on the main aspects of the OSCE. However, they do flot enable the reader to
understand the reasons and causes that produce these facts.
In short. such studies offer an important foundation to our understanding
of the OSCE but they do flot offer a complete picture of the causal mecanisms. In
This division can be seen in the three main publications on the OSCE: the Helsinki Monitor
journal, the annual OSCEyearbook and the Selected Bibliography produced by the Center for
OSCE Research (CORE) at the University ofHamburg. The classification made here, howevcr,
reflects the author’s analysis ofthe OSCE’s literature and does not nccessarily follows the
categorics introduced in these publications.
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this perspective, they are to be taken as an essential tool to understand the OSCE,
flot as the knowledge that provides its comprehension.
Categoiy II. Prescritive studies
The second category of po!icy-oriented analysis is prescriptive in nature. It
discusses how the OSCE should or ought to be in the future. Another section of
this prescriptive work focuses on how and why we should export the OSCE mode!
in other parts of the world (Duffie!d 2001). With the neyer ending
institutiona!ization process ofthe OSCE and the permanent changes made within
and around the organization, this category of work has expanded in recent years
and now forrns an important part ofthe OSCE !iterature. It is for this reason that it
is inc!uded in this !iterature review. However, due to its po!icy-oriented nature,
this body of work does flot fit within the objectives of this text. It is however
important for two things. f irst, it sheds light on what is important empirically
within the OSCE. As such, because it focuses on specific and important aspects of
how the OSCE should be. these policy-oriented studies direct our attention to
these e!ements and help us identify what is important to study. Re!ated to this, it
forces a student ofthe OSCE to be aware ofthe practical imp!ications of his work.
In short, research on the OSCE shou!d be able to answer questions that are
important for the OSCE community and has some practicat considerations. This
wil! make sure that work done on the OSCE is not method or theory driven, but
a!so prob!em-driven.
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Category III: Constructivist —oriented studies
The third and final category of OSCE studies consists oftheoretical work
on the OSCE. However, much ofthe theoretically-related work on the OSCE uses
a constructivist framework, with onÏy a few exceptions (Grussendorf 199$,
Mottola 1997, Mosser 2001, Remacle 1995). Since the objective ofthis literature
review is to grasp the theoretical dilemmas related to the OSCE, this third section
is analyzed in detail in the following section.
Thinldng theoretically about the OSCE
Buidiing on the contribution by Michael Merligen (2003) on the state of
the art ofthe OSCE studies, this section reviews research that analyzes the OSCE
from a theoretical perspective or by using substantive theoretical elements to
develop the arguments made. A preliminary assessment effectively tends towards
reaffirming Merligen’s conclusion. few OSCE related studies are theoretically
driven, and this state of the field reflects the trend discussed in the previous
section : a concentration of descriptive and prescriptive material on the OSCE.
However, among the few studies discussed here that focus on IR theories, the
starting point is usually a constructivist framework. This constructivist literature
can be dividcd in several categories the role of norms within the OSCE (Thomas
2001; f lynn and farreli 1999; Leatherman 2003). the socialization cffect of the
OSCE (Merligen and Ostrauskai 2004, 2005; Kelley 2004), the role of power
within the OSCE (Merligen 2003; Tudyka 2000), the security community
dimension ofthe OSCE (Hong 1996; Adler 199$). Even though the most ftcquent
starting point is constructivisrn, some authors use different approaches such as
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rationalism and realism (Remacle 1995) or a combination / synthesis ofdifferent
approaches (Grussendorf 1998; Mottola 1997; Mosser 2001).
This section reviews the different categories of constructivist research
highlighted in this paragraph and other theoretically-engaged studies on the OSCE
in order to offer a more comprehensive state ofthe art on the OSCE literature.
The role ofnorms within the OSCE
Three authors (Thomas 2001; Leatherman 2003; f lynn and farrell 1999)
attempt to link the OSCE to a normative framework. While they differ as to
which norm rnattered and how it mattered, they ail share the assumption ofa logic
of approprieteness (March and Olsen 1998).
0f the four books Merligen (2003) reviewed, only one qualifies as a
theoretically problem-driven approach : Daniel Thomas’s The Helsinki Effect:
International Norms, Human Rights, and the Dernise of Connnunism (2001). Even
though this book studies the CSCE process during the Cold War, the impact it had
and the relevance of the theoretical framework makes it a worthwhile starting
point. Thomas uses a constructivist framework to study three eÏements of thc
Helsinki final Act: “the evolution, framing and effects of human rights norms”
(20). He argues that one of the principal effect of the final Act is the demise of
cornmunism through, in part, the framing and effects of human rights norms
present in 1975 in the final Act. This Helsinki effect is thus an essential part of
the puzzle to understand the end ofthe Cold War.
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Janie Leatherman (2003) develops an analytical framework to understand
the role ofthird parties within the CSCE and their effects on peaceful change. She
argues that the Neutral and Non-Aligned Movement within the CSCE (the N+N)
were the driving force in implementing norms for peaceful change within the
CSCE. By using a model of mediation between the N+N and the two
superpowers, Leatherman (2003) explains the role of the N+N in the
internalization of this peaceful change norm. She concludes by arguing that the
N+N were the most successful actors in institutionalizing within the CSCE forum
the norms for peaceful change.
The article by flynn and Farrel (1999) analyses the diffusion of norrns
within the OSCE region during the 1990s. By using a constructivist framework to
study the development of substate conflicts in the OSCE, Flynn and Farrell bring
two main concepts : that norms enable states to achieve a certain behaviour and
that this provides a framework where choice and agency codify the structure and
the institutional development ofthe OSCE (thus the focus is on the states as actors
in their model). In describing the evolution of the OSCE, they divide this
evolution in two phases. The first phase is the codification of norms. Bctween
1989 and 1992, and especially during the Charter of Paris, the participating states
agreed to a set of norms to be adopted in Europe (in their study of substate
conflicts, the ernphasis is put on the minority rights as new norms). The second
phase is the diffusion ofnorms after 1992. This is done in two parts. First norms
are adopted consciously and then internalized: initial changes to norms were
consciously sought whiÏe subsequent modifications were derivative of the initial
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choices. This path dependency approach to the internalization of norms fails
however to explicit the mechanisms that enable this process.
In their conclusion, the authors discuss alternative paradigms that could
explain the evolution of the OSCE during the 1990s. Neorealism is quickly
dismissed on the ground that the material structure and the power configurations
do not match completely the patterns of norm diffusion. Liberal institutionalism
would fare better they argue, but it would fail to distinguish the reasons why states
would act accordingiy to the normative ftamework developed at the beginning of
the 1990s. In the end, they argue that constructivism offers the best explanation of
the evolution ofthe OSCE afier the Cold War.
If flynn and Farrell (1999) were indeed correct, this would undermine the
objectives of this project (i.e. using a theoretical starting point to study the
evolution ofthe OSCE afier 1990 that is flot completely constructivist). However,
their discussion is limited by three elements. f irst, they argue that power matters
somehow (though flot exactly according to neorealism, cf. Guzzini 1993) but fail
to clearly specify why and how it does. Second, while their explanation of how a
normative ftamework was wanted and adopted in theory by the participating in
the Charter of Paris is coherent, their emphasis on the post Helsinki-II period does
flot achieve such level of coherence. The internai ization process of norms is taken
for granted: they do flot specify the means by which this internalization happened
nor do they specify alternative explanations to the role of norms. f inally, their
argument does not discuss at length the differences between Western European
approaches to norms and the post-communist perspectives. They simpiy
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acknow!edge that a difference exists, but again do flot attempt to systernatical!y
study this aspect. In short, by making norms as both the cause (norms as enabler)
and the effect (the internalization of norms being the driving force in the
development of the European security environment and the OSCE), their mode!
!acks a coherent model ofthe evo!ution ofthe OSCE. Whi!e it is c!ear that for the
authors norms mafter, it is unc!ear for the reader as to how and why they matter.
The sociaÏization effect of the OSCE
Two authors address the question of the socia!ization effect of the OSCE
(Mer!ingen and Ostrauskai 2004, 2005; Ke!!ey 2004). Their main objective is to
study how the OSCE shapes the behavior of states by providing a framework of
reference for norms. They thus argue that the OSCE is a too! for the transmission
of libera! and democratic norms in the post-communist region.
Michae! Mer!igen and Rasa Ostrauskai (2005) argue that the OSCE has
becorne “an agency for the promotions of norms centred on human security”
(127). The OSCE is thus an institutiona! structure that socia!ize countries and
actors in targeted countries to the values and norms of the Euro-At!antic
community. They divide the “OSCE’s socia!ization toolkit” (129) into rewards /
punishments tools and training / mediation techniques. They argue that the
OSCE’s main strategy is a phi!osophy ofknowledge creation and transfer (131).
In their conclusion, they note that the OSCE has become a socia!izing agency that
relies !ess on rewards and punishements than on its communicative action and
mediation ski!!s (145).
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In her analysis of the OSCE, Kelley (2004) tries to understand the
influence ofEuropean institutions (Council of Europe (C0E), European Union and
OSCE) in post-communist countries regarding norms about ethnic minorities. She
argues that mernbership conditionality related to the EU was a driving force, but
that normative pressures corning from the OSCE and the CoE also influenced the
policymaking of certain post-communist countries (10). In her theoretical
framework, she links her work to the socialization literature, but she prefers the
term of normative pressures (23). This bas the added value, she argues, of
including mechanisms such as membership conditionality and other tools that
have concrete incentives. Yet, when she refers to the role of the OSCE, she
mainly refers to socialization practices. In her conclusion, she notes that
conditionality has the most effect, but that normative pressures are a useful
complementary tool. Despite some failures ofthe OSCE socialization mechanisms
such as the High Commissionner on National Minorities, the OSCE has had some
positive effects, for example in Slovakia. In the end, she makes two important
remarks. First, the level of dornestic opposition does have an impact on the
influence of international organizations. Then, she also notes that her case studies
offer proofs ofthe separate, and Iinked, influences ofboth concrete incentives and
socialization practices.
The i-ole ofpower within the OSCE
Two authors (Tudyka 2000; Merlingen 2003) use a constructivist
ftamework to understand the role of power within the OSCE. Merlingen (2003)
uses a critical constructivist approach to make his argument while Tudyka (2000)
outlines the normative structure that binds power within the OSCE.
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The article by Tudyka (2000) is, in his own words, an “essay [that]
presents prcliminary findings and thus rather outlines the feasibility of a study on
hegemony” (239). Thus, this work should only be considered as an illustration of
the possibility of understanding power through the diffusion of hegemony within
the OSCE, not as a demonstration of the way power works within the OSCE.
Starting from a realist perspective on hegemony where the OSCE can only work
insofar as the hegernon wishes it to work (239), Tudyka then develops a
framework where the institutional structure ofthe OSCE can ernbed the hegemon
into a framework that atlows norrnsetting operations and autonomous
policymaking by the organizations (241). Thus, he provides a framework in which
both traditional hegemonic power and norrnsetting behaviour influence the OSCE.
In short, he adds another variable to the traditional realist understanding of power
within international organizations.
Merligen’s work (2003) develops a foucaldian framework to study power
relations within the OSCE. His research focuses on the sources and use ofpower
within the OSCE. The foucauldian ftamework which he uses is centered around
the “micro domains ofpower relations formed and sustained by IGOs” (362). His
main objective is to study the techniques of government to gain power and the
rationalities of these practices. In short, Merlingen applies the concept of
governmentality to the study of the OSCE : “Governrnentality thus highlights
everyday relations of power extending beyond the central state, microinstitutional
relations of power that order societies” (366). He then proceeds to make his
argument clearer by analyzing the means and techniques ofthe OSCE the long-
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term missions and the High Commissionner on National Minorities. In the end,
these technologies ofthe OSCE enable the organization to have a diffuse forrn of
power on countries it atternpts to socialize in the Western security cornmunity
(377).
In the end however, Merligen’s framework gives little in term of
generalization : “The main ‘value added’ of such a framework is that it brings into
focus the micro-domain of power relations, thereby highlighting what mainline
1GO studies, including research on international socialization, fail to thematize.”
(377). This is flot to say that his vision of how the diffusion of power is done at
the micro level is wrongly stated, but that the level of analysis he uses does not
serve the purpose of this study : to study the interaction between the overail
structure of the OSCE and the participating states. Such a conceptualization of
power does not help to understand the larger ftarnework.
The security community dimension of the OSCE
Another school of analysis, which could be classifled as constructivist, is
the one centered around security community. Hong (1997) and Adler (199$)
illustrate, both theoretically and empirically, this approach.
Both studies originate from the research program launched by Karl
Deutsch et al (1957). However, while the work by Hong (1997) is ernpirically
more developed (his main objective is to illustrate the development ofthe OSCE
into a security-community model), the theoretical renewal proposed by Adler and
Barnett in their volume on security communities (1998) gives an added value to
2$
Adler’s chapter on the OSCE. For this reason, this review concentrates on Adter’s
work (199$). For a full view ofthe applicability ofthe security community model
concerning the development of the C/OSCE (until 1995), the work of Ki-Joon
Hong (1997) remains essential.
Adler (1998) argues that the creation of a security community within the
Euro-Atlantic comrnunity has been fostered by institutions such as NATO, the
Councif of Europe and the OSCE (119). He then proceeds to evaluate the role of
the OSCE in the construction of a security community. He highlights seven key
elements that the OSCE provides to the making of the Euro-Atiantic security
community, among which the developrnent of mutual trust and cooperation and
the norms 0f peaceful resolution ofconflicts (132). He then shows how the OSCE
frames these particular norms : serninar diplomacy, cooperative security,
cornmunity building-devices, etc. (132-142). In his conclusion, Adler argues that
the OSCE shaped the security cornmunity in Europe flot by reducing transactions
costs, but rather by transforming the practices of the participating states and
ernbedding these practices in a normative framework centred around the concept
ofcooperative security (149-150).
Non-constructivst approaches to the study ofthe O$C’E
While the studies reviewed above showed a clear trend towards using a
constructivist framework to study the OSCE, it would be a false representation to
put ail theory-related research on the OSCE within this constructivist basket. A
few authors have tried to shed light on the OSCE using different theoretical tools.
Yet, these studies do flot have the impact or the explanatory value that the
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constructivist literature presents. In fact, only the work of Grussendorf (199$) and
Mosser (2001) use a non-constructivist framework. The other studies analyzed
here simply mention their theoretical school or make a brieftheoretical note.
In this last category, we found the research done by Remacle (1995) and
Mottota (1997). Eric Remacle conctudes his book on the OSCE and conflict in
Europe by highlighting that “We cannot avoid the application of a neorealist
framework ofanalysis to the OSCE in which the interests ofthe great and middle
powers that compose it are reflected in its actions” ( 134). Yct despite, this final
remark, bis work contains no other explicit or detailed theoretical elements rclated
to this one.
Mottota (1997) clearly puts ber work in theoretical perspectives. However,
ber objective is to demonstrate the possibility of combining different theoretical
framcworks to the study of the OSCE She uses three separate theories
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the security community model. She
first argues that neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are effective in
explaining the security behavior of the OSCE (191). Then, she concludes that
non-traditional theories like constructivism are also effective and thus that alt
three theories are able to provide some explanations and that they are
complemcntary. Her work, however, does flot test the relative complementary and
does flot offer a mode 1 to use these theories together. In the end, she simply daims
that theory (or more correctly theories) can bc used to study the OSCE and that
they are useful tools.
Translation by the author : On ne peut éviter d’appliquer à I’OSCE une grille de lecture
néoréaliste dans laquelle transparaissent les intérêts et représentations des grandes et moyennes
puissances qui la composent (Remacle 1995).
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On the other end of this spectrum, we find the studies of Grussendorf
(1998) and Mosser (2001) who not only mention theory, but actually engage and
embed their work within theoretical frameworks.
Michael Mosser (2001) attempts to understand how power is organized
within international organizations. More specifically, he seeks to understand how
minor actors within these international organizations engineer influence. In order
to do so, he creates a theoretical framework that combines realism and historical
institutionalism. By putting forward a sequencing model using two versions of
rationalism to explain how influence is engineered, Mosser stresses the
importance of the concept of temporally-instrumental norms, that encompasses
the notion that norms may be used as tools and do not necessarly need to be
constitutive or internalized. When he applies this framework to the OSCE,
Mosser distinguishes between the creation phase (1975) and the renegociation
phase (after the Cold War). He argues that the N+N (the minor actors within the
CSCE process) were most succesful in engineering their influence during the
creation phase and that this influence was Iess important during the renegotiation
phase in part due to power politics and realist behaviour by the major powers. Yet,
he also flnds that the N+N group within the CSCE was able to use norms in order
to engineer influence. In this framework, the norms are flot generative of new
behaviour, but are simply mechanisms used rationally by states (and minor actors)
in order to influence die behaviour of other participants. Thus he agrees with
Leatherman (2003) on the role of the N+N group within the OSCE, but he
disagrees on the role of norms. Whule Mosser (2001) adopts a logic of
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consequentialism related to a rationalist framework, Leatherman (2003) builds her
argument on a logic ofapproprietencss.
Grussendorf (1998) makes a different theoretical contribution. She begins
by testing different theoretical perspectives on the OSCE, a task similar to the one
done by Mottola (1997). However, not only does she present the theoretical
perspective in a better way, but she also engages on the impact of theorizing on
the OSCE. Afier describing the development of the OSCE, Grussendorf (1998)
asks a central question: “The main question to be asked at this juncture is how this
development can be explained” (14). She then proceeds to test ncorealist and neo
liberal perspectives on the OSCE in order to assess the impact of theory on
practices of multilateralism (14). On the neorealist perspective, she notes that
applying this framework to the development ofthe OSCE provides an interesting
starting point (15). “Within the neo-realist framework, the behaviour of the
superpowers is paramount in understanding global politics (16). On the other
hand, “A neo-liberal interpretation ofthe development ofthe C/OSCE stresses the
greater role and importance accredited to the European states in as much as their
influence in inter-state affairs gained greater impetus within the organization than
would otherwise have been possible. “ (20). Afler depicting both theories and
their possible application to the development of the OSCE, Grussendorf (1998)
then puts these two theories in relation to the practice ofmultitateralism.
The above outiine ofthe neo-liberal approach indicates that when the
limited neo-realist approach is broadened to include economic
structures as welI as relations between states, then the role of
multilateral organizations, too, can be viewed differently. From this it
follows that, while the policy implications of the neo-realist approach
point to a pessimistic future for the OSCE, the neo-liberal approach is
more optimistic by pointing towards further institutionalization of
existing structures. (22)
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The work of Grussendorf (199$) thus shows both the potential and the
limits of applying neoliberal and neorealist frarnework to the development of the
OSCE. While she focuses on the links between theory and practice, she also
highlights the links between theories in developing a relevant analytical
framework.
This literature review of relevant theoretical work on the OSCE enabled us
to highlight the state of the art of theory-related OSCE studies. f irst, the
constructivist lens is effectivety the rnost frequent starting point. However, within
the constructivist literature, authors do flot necessarly agree on what constitutes
and defines the norms, identity and roles ofthe OSCE. The OSCE may be a norm
building institution, a norm teacher or a security-community building structure. 1f
we review the non-constructivist literature, we find that it lacks the coherence or
the depth ofthe constructivist literature and that the studies with sufficient causal
depth (Kitschelt 2003) are almost inexistant with two major exceptions (Mosser
2001 and Grussendorf 1998). More generally, we have found only thirteen (13)
theory-related studies on the OSCE. When compared to the prescriptive and
descriptive category of OSCE studies, this third category is almost non-existant.
In the second chapter, a detailed analysis ofthe theoretical and empirical gaps of
the OSCE will be made. It is enough for the moment to stress the Iack oftheory
related on the OSCE. and especially of non-constructivist theory related work.
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Framing the debates on the design and effects of international organizations
The objectives of this section are simple : to review relevant theoretical
framework within the studies of international organizations in order to highlight
possible ways to theorize about the OSCE. The first part traces the way different
theoretical schools caracterize international organizations. Then, some specific
theoretical frameworks are analyzed in order to assess both the ways we can study
international organizations and the questions we might ask about the roles and
impacts of international organizations today.
In this overview, the terrns of the debates in the study of international
organization are also invcstigated : what is the nature and the potential
consequences of the division between rationalism and constructivism? How can
we, broadly, portray this debate? What are the limits and advantages of staging
the debate in this particular way? f inally, a brief summary is provided to frame
the discussion ofchapter two, on the development ofa theoretical ftamework.
Theoretical insights on international organizations
Neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and constructivism all say that
international organizations maffer. Constructivists argue that international
organizations should be treated as autonomous actors in their own right (Strange
1998; Barnett and f innemore 1999, 2004). On the other end, for neorealists,
international organizations matter only to the extent that states use them to
strenghten their position. They argue that states are the main actors on the
international scene and that international organizations only play a minor and
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subordinate role (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994; Schweller 1997). Between
those two positions, neoliberal institutionalists put forward a view of international
organizations where they are tools for states. They help reduce uncertainty,
transactions costs, they serve as bargaining forums for exchanging ideas,
preferences and positions (Martin 1992, 1992a; Moravscik 1997; Abbot and
Snidal 199$; Fearon 1998; Simmons and Martin 2005). In this rationalist
perspective, states rely on international organizations because these institutions
present rational benefits to these states. Rooted in exchange theory, the neoliberal
institutionalists thus put forward a classic cost / benefits argument (Kehoane
1984; Kahler 199$).
Acknowledging that international organizations do matter in theory across
ail three major theoreticai schools ofthought in international organizations is only
one part of the puzzle. It is essential to go deeper than the simple statement that
international organizations matter to a certain degree. When, how, where and why
do they matter? In what domains do international organizations work the best and
why? These practical questions are also addressed in the theoreticai literature on
international organizations. However, the range and scope of the literature is too
vast to be fully analyzed here. Instead, this section wiil give an overview ofrecent
perspectives on the roles and impacts of international organizations. This
overview will serve as the background on which both the debate between
rationalism and constructivism is framed and the design of this research paper
made.
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Starting from the assumptions that international organizations are
autonomous actors, constructivists have mostly studied the bchaviour and
functions of international organizations while the rationalists have taken the task
of explaining the design of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore
1999; Mosser 2001; Koremenos et al 2001; Barnett and Coleman 2005). framing
the debate between the design and effects of international organizations, even
though it simplifies the complexity of international organizations, makes clearer
the way academics do research on them. As such these two categories can inform
us on what are the main controversies and divisions in the study of international
organizations as well as the defining features of these institutions.
In the rationalist literature, one might find that the effects of international
organizations are dependent on their design. This path-dependent tendency
(Thelen et al 1992; Pierson 2000) enables the authors to posit that their mode! on
the design of institutions has built-in consequences on their development. Recent
studies on the design of international institutions have included the project on the
rationaÏ design of institutions (Koremenos et al 2001), the literature on the design
and impacts of treaties (Martin 2005; von Stem 2005), the role of international
organizations, secretariats and their design (Hamlet 2003), the way states delegate
under anarchy (Pollack 1997, 2001; Lake et al 2006) and the specificities of
international security institutions (Williarns 1997; Duffield 2005).
If one assumes that international organizations are autonornous actors and
influence the international and domestic spheres independently oftheir design, the
scope of the work done under this constructivist lens is broader. It includes work
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on the pathologies of international organizations (Barneil and Finnemore 1999),
the links between democratization and international organizations (Pevehouse
2005; Pevehouse and Mansfleld 2006) the socialization effects of international
organizations (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005; f lockhart 2005), the relations
between the dernocratic peace and international organizations (Russett 1998) and
work on the domestic impacts of international organizations (Cortell and Davis
1996; Caporaso 1997; Mimer 1998).
A view towards a synthesis or how to buiÏd bridges in IR?
If instead we try to focus on the main debates in international relations
theory, one wilt find a reflection of the previous dichotomy between rationalist
and constructivst perspective (Katzenstein et al 1998). However, in recent years,
some have argued that flic rationalist and constructivist divide shoutd flot be
exaggerated (Fearon and Wendt 2005) and, following this, cails for theoretical
synthesis have been made (Caporaso 1997; Milner 1998; Sterling-Folker 2000;
Katzentstein and Okawara 2001; Checkel et al 2003, Fehl 2004; Tierney and
Weaver 2006).
Fearon and Wendt (2005) argue that rationalism and constructivisrn are flot
theories of international relations, but rather methodological approaches to the
study of international politics (52). In this view, they believe that both approaches
have substantial areas of agreements between them (52) and that framing the
debate in this fashion may limit problem-driven research and facilitate method
driven research (52), which would in turn limit the development of relevant
knowledge about international politics (68). They put forward five separate
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elements that separate both approaches (54), and higlight the key difference
between rationalism seen in the light of methodological individualism and
constructivism viewed as methodologicat holism (57). Yet, they argue in their
conclusion that both approaches are in several ways complementary (67) and that
the best way to tackle this so-called divide is pragmatically (68) : “In short, we
believe the most fruitful frarning of ‘rationalism vs constructivisrn’ is a pragmatic
one, treating them as analytical lenses for looking at social reality”.
Starting from these assumptions that both approaches are, and should be
treated as, complementary does not mean that they can be merged in a single
theory or analytical tool, but rather that this divide hinder our capabilities to
understand the realities of international politics. This bridge-building exercice
across different theoretical perspectives has been given more attention recently.9
Checkel and al (2003) then discussed the possible ways one might synthezise
across and within this rationalist-constructivist divide. By looking at the
institutional development ofthe EU, they seek a “better integration ofthe multiple
general conceptions of institutions and primarly rational and constructivist
(sociological) conceptions.” (8). The core of their article consists of a theoretical
dialogue between rationalist and constructivist positions in which they set an
agenda for the empirical studies of institutions. (8, 17). They put forward four
models of theoretical synthesis t competitive testing, additive theory based on
complementary domains of application, sequencing theories and subsumption.
(19). Competitive testing highlights the techniques of not only testing our theory
against the empirical evidence, but also on how it fare compared to other theories.
Zurn and Checkel (2005) note that “Bridge-building has indeed become trendy” (1046)
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(20). The domain of application method offers a minimalist version of synthesis.
In this model, theories have scope conditions and dornains of application that are
different and that apply specifically in their own domain, while leaving other
domains of application to other theories (21). The sequencing mode! starts from
the assumption that both approaches can be used together to explain a phenomena
over time, where one theory explains the flrst part and the other theory explains its
latter evolution (22). Examples of such work include Legro (1996) on conflict
formation and Moravscik on preference formation within the EU (1997).
Subsumption, or incorporation, seeks to demonstrate that one theory flows from
the other and is thus only a special case or a part of this theory. for example, a
constructivist view on cuittire that analyzes institutions and preferences
sociologicatly could argue that rationalist theory derives from these insights and
should then be placed as a subcategory ofconstructivism (23).
Another possible theoretical synthesis derives from the recent work of
Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara on analytical eclecticism (2001). The
analytical eclecticisrn perspective seeks to understand empirical realities by
refusing parsimony and engaging together the complexity of norms, institutions
and power within a single problem-driven perspective (154). In short,
“compelling explanations of empirical puzzles can be built through combining
realist, liberal and constructivist mode of explanations (17$). Yet, despite arguing
in favor of a multiplicity of theoretical perspectives, the authors do not speci1,’
how this might be done. They do suggest potential bridging points between
liberalism and realism, constructivism and rationalism, but they do not provide
concrete frameworks for combining these approaches. However, they do provide a
39
key point : “ Instead of approach-driven analysis, we advocate problem-driven
approach” (183). This is similar in content to the Fearon and Wendt (2005, 52)
argument and to the Checkel et al attempt at synthesis (2003, 8 and 17).
Moving from the field of international relations theory in general to the
particular domain of international organizations, one finds the sarne recurring cal!
for synthesis. f irst, Tierney and Weaver (2006) turn to a theoretical discussion on
the possibilities of theoretical synthesis within the field of international
organizations. They argue that in the new generation of international
organizations studies, theoretical debates and paradigms clashes might lead to a
degenerative research program that will lead to a theoretical dead end (3). Their
objective is to reconciliate theories of international relations with the real world
patterns that need to be understood. Starting again from the need to develop
models that offer better empirical analysis (4, 5), Tierney and Weaver (2006)
build their project flot on the idea of building bridge as an end, but rather “to
understand the conditions under which synthesis offer better explanations than we
might realize by proceeding independently with our own favored theory” (14). To
do so they highlight three centra! aspects of international organizations patterns
of design and delegation, the organization of 10 behavior and the process of 10
change (7).’° Starting from the Checkel et al article (2003), they proprose six
models of synthesis dialogue, competitive theory testing, domain of application,
sequencing, subsumption and ideational structures and dynamic sequences. four
of these are taken from Checkel and al (2003), while the other two propose ncw
forms of synthesis. The first one, dialogue, is flot a form of synthesis per se, but
Ibis is similar to our classification ofthe new generation of international organizations studies
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rather a pretiminary conditions under which proponents of different theoretical
perspectives might engage with one another in order to explore the possibility of
bridge-building (14-15). The other form of synthesis, ideational structures and
dynamic sequencing, is an advanced form of sequencing. Thus, this possibility is
similar to the two-step model, but the “steps are repeated in a dynamic process”
(21). In short, the influence of both agency and structure is dynamic and is
reflected at different period of the international organization life cycle (22). They
note however that this final model should follow a strict scientific procedure in
order to desentangle the effects of both elements ofthe dynamic sequencing.
An example of bridge-building can be found in fehl’s article (2004) on the
International Criminal Court (1CC). fehl (2004) seeks to understand the design of
the 1CC by using both rationalist and constructivist perspectives. In order to do so,
she first uses a rationalist approach to explain the design ofthe 1CC and then tries
to find if a constructivist approach can solve some of the problems faced by the
rationalist approach (359). She concludes her article by demonstrating that both
approaches can be taken together in three different ways. f irst, constructivist
explanation can demonstrate the formation of the rational interests that Ied to the
creation of the 1CC and thus deepen the argument (384). This is similar in form
and content to a sequencing model. Second, both models can offer complementary
perspective that are not mutually exclusive in specific domain of application. A
rationalist approach highlights the cost ofthe 1CC creation while a constructivist
perspective puts forward the legitimacy dimension (384). Finatly, a constructivist
tool might ‘solve’ a puzzle that the rationalist perspective cannot explain. In the
case of the 1CC, the reasons states chose a stronger court without the United
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Statcs might be explained in this fashion. This is a reversed two step where a
rationalist perspective is then completed by a constructivist explanation (384).
Fehl’s article thus enables us to see how theoretical synthesis might be done
empirically and how they add to our global understanding of an empirical
phenornena.
Conclusion
This chapter had two objectives : to provide a literature review on the
OSCE and highlight the need for a theoretical turn in OSCE studies and to discuss
potential theoretical framework of analysis to study the OSCE.
In the first section, a classification of the literature on the OSCE was
made: descriptive, prescriptive and constructivist studies. This section also
highlighted the need for a theoretical turn in the study of the OSCE. Section II
offered an overview ofthe state oftheoretical studies on the OSCE and found that
most studies have a constructivist lens and that these studies lack in term of both
quantity (13 in total) and quality. Section III then provided the tools for a
theoretical framework for the study ofthe design and effects ofthe OSCE. It gave
a general overview of the role of international organizations within international
relations theory. The final part of this section then gave an overview of the
possibilitiy of theoretical synthesis in international relations in general and some
examples of how these synthesis may be used to study international organizations.
The second chapter of this research uses the knowledge provided in this
section to establish three elements. First, it highlights the empirical gaps within
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the OSCE literature in order to assess what we should study. Then, it draws
attention towards the theoretical tools we might use to study the OSCE. Finally,
this chapter offers testable hypothesis about the OSCE and a complete theoretical
ftamework to study this hypothesis in a problem-driven fashion. Chapter III will
then consist of the solution to the empirical puzzle by distinguishing three phases
within the OSCE after the Cold War and defining these phases and their
implication using a process-tracing technique (George and Bennett 2005).
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Chapter II
Constructing a theoretical framework
Building on the insights and findings of the previous chapter, this chapter
provides the definition ofthe puzzle concerning the evolution ofthe OSCE using
thc gaps found in the literature and proceeds to develop a theoretical framework to
solve this puzzle. The empirical solution to this OSCE dilemma is lefi to the third
chapter of this research. In order to develop the necessary elements relevant to
the theoretical frarnework, this chapter is divided in thrce sections. f irst, a
detailed analysis of the literature review is made. Using the main findings of the
previous chapter, this section tries to focus the debate by identifiing the main
empirical and theoretical gaps within the literature. In short, it asks a simple
question: What are the most relevant elements about the OSCE that we do flot
clearly understand? A second section then turns to framing the question at hand. It
focuses on two elements: the precise terms of the puzzle that this study seeks to
understand and the hypothesis drawn from this problem. The third section consists
of the theoretical framework itself. A preliminary overview puts the model in
relations with the current debates within international relations and the field of
international organizations. The ncxt part gives the main assumptions underlying
this model. The third part explains the conceptual framework in detail, including
the definition of the dependent and independent variables used in this study. A
final section concludes this chapter by addressing the methodology of this study.
It discusses both the overall method used in this project, process-tracing, and the
way it is applied to the study ofthe design ofthe OSCE.
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Identifying the gaps in the literature
Empirical gaps
The literature review made in the previous chapter highlights a number of
elements about the OSCE that are either not deait with or that are lefi
underdeveloped. An initial caveat, however, should be made. Many studies
address specific issues within the OSCE, such as the effect ofone field mission on
the development of a single issue (i.e. the impact of the long-term missions in
Georgia on the so-called ftozen conflicts). However, reviewing a large portion of
the OSCE literature in the flrst chapter and then stating that what we need is more
detailed case-studies and in turn devoting this research project to the analysis ofa
precise case within a precise geographical and temporal framework would flot
futfill the objectives of this paper. This does not mean that case studies on the
OSCE activities are not useful, but rather that the focus of this study is towards
understanding issues at a broader level.
As such, by looking at the gaps within the OSCE literature, the objective is
to understand how we can globally portray the OSCE. for this purpose, three
elements stand out. f irst, too few studies (i) encompass a time frame that spans
the whole post-Cold War period and (ii) attempt to connect different elements
together. The focus is on specific case studies, flot on possible rniddle-range
generalizations. Finally, (iii) a large amount of OSCE studies provide only
shallow explanations (Kitschelt 2003). As mcntioned in the previous chapter,
descriptive and prescriptive analyses of the OSCE form the vast majority of
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OSCE studies. Yet, while they are useful to familiarize ourselves on the actual
situation and the ongoing debates and trends, they do flot help us make causal
inferences and they do flot address the key issue ofwhy is the OSCE the way it is
and the way it will I should be. In short, by adopting a short time frarne and a
single aspect ofthe OSCE activities / structure, the majority ofthe research on the
OSCE does not enable us to understand the root causes of the changes within the
OSCE afier the Cold War.
If we look at the theory-related studies on the OSCE, the time frame
problem remains. Some recent studies are interested in looking at the history of
the CSCE (Mosser 2001; Thomas 2001; Leatherman 2003) while those which
focus on the post-Cold War period do not offer a full view of the period after the
Istanbul Summit in 1999 (Remacle 1995; Moilola 1997; Grussendorf 1998; Adler
199$; Flynn and Farrell 1999; Tudyka 2000; Mosser 2001;). Concerning the scope
of these studies, they do offer a broader perspective on the OSCE. Yet, if we turn
at the third gap we identified in the literature, we find that the explanations
offered usual ly highlight traditional constructivist analytical tools (norms, security
community, identity transformation) and neglect the power dimension and the
strategic calculations ofparticipating states.
Theoretical gaps
As noted above and in chapter I, much of the theoretically oriented
research on the OSCE uses a constructivist framework. The structure and the
design ofthe OSCE effectively seem to be an easy case for constructivist analysis:
the consensus rule seems to enable each actor to influence the OSCE and power
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thus plays a less central role while the focus is on collective identity, social and
norniative persuasion, all elements largely documented in the constructivist
literature in general (Adler 1997, Pouliot 2001); the decisions and documents of
the OSCE reflect its focus on the development of liberal democratic norms,
another constructivist concern; and the decentralized structure of the OSCE, the
High Commissioner on National Minorities and the long-term missions seem to
shape the OSCE’s role as a forum for the development and internalization of
norms rather than as a tool for powerful states. These are defined, amongst other,
by the concept of seminar diplomacy (Adier 199$) or knowledge creation and
transfer (Merlingen and Ostraukai 2005).
Recent studies have however illustrated that norrns may be studied from a
pluratity of perspective. It should flot be taken for grantcd that what scems to be a
fit betwcen constructivist theory and empirical data is necessarily what it appears
at first sight: potential illusions and pitfalls created by common sense should be
carefully taken into considerations (Collier 1996). Thus, there is a need to use new
or different theoretical perspectives in order to gain a befter understanding of the
empirical reality within the OSCE and the dynamics and impacts ofnorms.
Framing the debate
The evolution ofthe OSCE: o puzzle
The transformation and the evolution ofthe OSCE between 1990 and 2006
still remains a puzzle to the academic community. Some studies help understand
part of this evolution, but the overail ftamework of this evolution and the
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consequences it had are lefi mostly unanswered. Descriptive studies ofthe OSCE
show thc consequences of particular events of decisions, but they do flot offer a
broad picture of this institutionalizatïon process. Prescriptive studies highlight
possible ways oftransforming the OSCE, but they do flot provide the reasons why
the OSCE has institutionalized in this particular design and what are the effects of
this institutional design. Constructivist-oriented studies on the OSCE suggest the
importance of the normative ftamework within the OSCE, yet these studies
mostly look at the extemal effects ofthe norms and flot on the effects ofnorms on
the institutional design of the OSCE. Other theory-driven work on the OSCE
showed the importance of the participating states’ interests, but focused on the
effects this had on the OSCE behaviour and actions vis-à-vis other states or
institutions. They also overlook the effects this had on the institutional design of
the OSCE.
In short, this study seeks to answer the following empirical questions:
Which factors, and how, influenced and shaped the transformation of the OSCE
afier the Cold War? What are the impacts of this specific process of
transformation on the development ofthe OSCE today?
This particuÏar question makes two important attempts to liii the empirical
and theoretical gaps within the OSCE literature. f irst, it aftempts to solve the time
frame problem by looking at the entire period afier the CoId War (1990-2006),
from the euphoria of 1990 to the actual crisis, encompassing the main
institutionalization process between these two periods. Secondly, it aftempts to fil
the gap on the internai effects of both norms and participating states’ interests. It
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does so by flot only looking at the way norms and national interests affects the
way the OSCE interacts with other states, institutions or in conflict situation, but
by aiso looking ut the effects this had on the internai behaviour of the OSCE. By
integrating the internai and external effects of both normative pressures and
national interests, this question derives from an historical institutionalist
background, where the design had important and critical impacts on the actions
and behaviour of the organization between 1990 and 2006. It attempts to show
that to analyze the effects of the OSCE afier the Cold War on security issues in
Europe, it is essentiat to study its redesign and its transformation from an open
discussion forum through an almost full-fledged international organization.
Main Arguments
This project first argues that the transformation of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe has been mostly influenced by the liberal
democratic norms present in the Western security community. However, these
norrns were not integrated as part of Iogic of appropriateness, and thus flot
internalized by the East European and post-Soviet countries. Instead, it is the
manipulative, strategic and rationai use of these norms — through the concept of
rhetoricai action - that accounts for the way the OSCE has redesigned itseif.
The second argument that this study advances is that this particular process
of institutionalization led inevitably
— in a path-dependent process
— to the actuai
crisis and the stalemate of this organization, the main consequence of its internai
evolution that we see today.
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Thus, the deliberate and strategic use of the liberal democratic norms by
the different participating states within the OSCE flot only shaped its
institutionalization process, but ït also had the consequence of recreating new
dividing unes within this organization and thus provide the background for the
ongoing crisis within the OSCE.
Alternative expÏanations
Not only does this approach proposes a theoretically informed way of
understanding the transformation of the OSCE afier the Cold war, it also fares
better than other theoretical explanations. f irst, the founding principles of the
OSCE rest on normative grounds. This implies that a transactional approach based
on Iiberal—institutionalist theory would fail to take into consideration the
normative aspect of the OSCE. It would be able to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the actual state of the OSCE, namely the clash of participating states’
interests that shape the ongoing crisis, but would have difficulty, especially in the
context ofthe alphabet soup ofregional security institutions in Europe, to explain
the initial redesign of the OSCE. In contrast, a constructivist approach would
provide relevant explanations on the redesign ofthe OSCE, namcly on the basis of
common values and integrated —internalized liberal democratic norms. Yet, if
these norms and values were internalized, the state ofthe OSCE in 2006 woutd be
rnuch brighter and an institutional crisis would notjeopardize the organization. As
such, both perspectives offer partial explanations of the puzzle, but do not offer a
complete picture of this evolution. By using a synthesis model, the arguments
made in this study present a more detailed and complete view of the OSCE
between 1990 and 2006.
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The theoretical mode!
In order to illustrate the transformation and evolution of the OSCE afier
the Cold War and provide the empirical evidence to the two main arguments this
project makes, this section develops the theoretica! model used in this anatysis.
The first part begins by locating the mode! within the international organizations
and international relations theory !iterature. The second part shows the main
assumptions ofthe mode! and its principal mechanisms. The final section provides
the detaits of this conceptual framework by highlighting the dependent and
independent variables and discussing the working logic ofthis model.
On international relations theoiy
This project is first related to international relations theory via its attempt
to produce a synthesis across constructivist and !iberal-institutionalist theories.
Drawing from the literature review made in the previous chapter, the model used
here is akin to the sequencing attempts at synthesis. To be consistent with the
argument made in this research, the mode! starts with rationalist assumptions
about the participating states’ interests. However, to be accurate, this mode! then
shows the role ofnorms and their evolution with the OSCE environment in order
to deepen the argument. These two elements are !inked in a two step sequence
(Legro 1997). However, this process is reversed in the sense that it begins with a
rationalist exp!anation of nationaL interests’ formation and deepens the
explanation by !ooking at the construction of the organizations through the
interactions of the participating states within a constitutive !iberal democratic
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environment. This second step thus looks at the sociology of group interactions
within this organization.
Yet, it also rejects the notion that these two steps are distinct and occupy
specific and different time frames. While they can be analytica!!y separated to
present better explanations, they should be seen in a comptex process. As such,
this mode! also follows the lead of Tierney and Weaver (2006) on the 6th
possibi!ity of synthesis: dynamic sequencing. These authors are however vague
on the application of such process in empirical terms. To resolve this
indeterminacy, the mode! used here adopts a path-dependent outcome. This has
the added value ofparsimony (the dynamic part of sequencing is always linked to
the same concept) and it can be easily replicated (the concept rernains the same
throughout the evolution of the OSCE and thus can be analyzed at different
periods). To be sure, however, path dependency does not simp!y means that past
matters, if”this concept has to mean anything, it means that the cost ofgoing into
another direction is increasing!y high” (Levy 9g)•1 Drawing from this concept, it
is possible to see that the initial preferences of the participating states are
reinforced when they interact within the !ibera! democratic environment.
This mode! distinguishes, analytically, between national interests’
formation, states’ interactions and path-dependent outcomes. Epi stemoÏogicat!y,
‘‘If we look at the OSCE today, one might think that path-dependency theory means that the
OSCE’s crisis is structural and thus cannot be resolved. However, one might also argue that path
dependency leaves some place to agency and that political actors can change the direction ofthe
OSCE, aÏthough at a high cost. This is usually done in the context of critical junctures, sec on this
matter and for a variation on the concept of path dependency (the notion of path contingency),
Johnson 2001
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this model rather applies a dynamic sequencing mode! of international relations
theories synthesis between rationalist and constructivist theoretical models.
On international organizations literature
While the focus of this study is on the how states (re) designed the OSCE
and how the OSCE evolved afier the Cold War, it also addresses issues found in
current debates on the roles and effects of international organizations. This study
deals with issues such as compliance, international socialization and
conditionality.
Starting with the recent developments on the socialization effect of
international organizations, this study makes a modest proposa!. Drawing from the
categorization made by Risse et al (1999) on the different level of sociatization
(on a scale ranging from the rejection of norms to its complete intemalization), the
socialization within the OSCE is found between these two extremes. Norrns are
flot rejected by states, but they are flot internalized: they are part of a rational
strategy and form part of the toolkit of states to advance their own interests. This
assumption is driven by recent findings on both the OSCE (Kelley 2004) and the
enlargement of the EU and NATO (Schirnmelfennig 2005) as well as the
concluding remarks made by Johnston in the special issue of International
Organization on “Socialization in Europe” (2005). It also highlights some
hypothesis made by Zurn and Checkel in the final article of this special issue
(2005).
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Re!ated to the socialization literature, although flot directly associated with
this project, the literature on conditionality (Kelley 2004) couÏd benefit from this
mode!. In short, by demonstrating that the effect ofnorms is !imited and cannot be
entirely successfu! to socia!ize states within the !ibera! democratic environment, at
!east in Europe, this project high!ights the potentia! importance of conditiona!ity
and materia! incentives.
f ina!ly, this study also i!lustrates the motivations behind comp!iance and
the consequences of comp!iance and non compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993;
Ba!dwin 1999; Pape 199$) regarding the ru!es and decisions taken by
international organizations. This project thus puts in relation the normative
conditions for comp!iance with the participating states’ main interests and
attempts to analyze the key elements ofthis relationship.
The origin and assumptions ofthe rnodeÏ
The model designed here to exp!ain the evolution and transformation of
the OSCE afier the Co!d War derives from recent socio!ogica! imports into the
domain of internationa! re!ations theory. This section first introduces the work of
Erving Goffman and the way his ana!ytica! work was used in internationa!
re!ations. Another paragraph i!Iustrates the way frank Schimme!fenning first
adapted the mode! to explain the successive enlargements of NATO and the EU.
A final note is made to characterize the way this model can be adapted to the
study of internationa! organizations’ change.
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What many titled the constructivist turn in international relations theory
(Checkel 199$, Adler 1997, Pouliot 2004) referred to a sociological turn in which
the main actors on the international scene, states, are not treated as unitary actors
with fixed preferences and identities, but rather as socialty constructed (Wendt
1992). Yet, this sociological turn does flot necessarily involve a constructivist tum
(Schimmelfenning 2001).
Recently, frank Schimmelfennig (2002, 423) used Erving Goffman theory
of dramaturgical action to study aspects of international relations: “This theory
conceptualizes actors in a cultural environment as performers engaged in
manipulative prescntations of self and framing who are, at the same time,
constraincd by the script and consistency requirement oftheir roles”.
While Goffman’s work is diverse and complex and branches into several
directions, it is his theorization of how actors play the garne in everyday life that
aftracted recent interest from IR theorists.
This theory of dramaturgical action is an attempt to explain the behaviours
of actors in a particular mediated game. Within a defined set of rules, actors
interact with other actors using the framing and sharning techniques. These two
processes refer to the way actors use thc rules of the game to advance their own
interests and to influence the other actors in the game. The first process, frarning
refers to the attempt by an actor or a group of actors to impose a particular vision
or representation of an event by framing-highlighting the way to which the event
is referrcd to. The framing process also guides us towards to notion of a struggie
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between competing visions of the event and competing attempts to frame an cvent
differently. In the vocabulary of the scene used by Goffmann, the actors thus try
to produce a script for a particular evdnt and frame the event within this particular
script and represent themselves as part ofthe script. The sharning process consists
of embarrassing other actors by forcing them to either lose face or to play withïn
the framed script and to represent thernselves either out of character or within the
script even if this frame of reference is flot their preferred choice. These
techniques can be understood as ways of representing an actor within a scene (or
cornrnunity) and the way actors frarne the scene in order for their interests be
maximized. In short, they may strategically use these frames of reference to
sharne other actors who do flot play within the script and thus constrain them in
the script and force upon them a role which they are unwilling to take, but must
do so in order to stay within the scene (or the comrnunity). Taken together these
two techniques define the manipulative scheme ofthe relations between the actors
within the rule-bounded environment.
By bringing Goffman social theory on the strategic views ofnorms into the
domain of international relations theory, $chimmelfennig ptits his research in
relation to the debate between rationalisrn and constructivism. FIe presents
Goffman’s insights as a possibility of synthesizing between these two approaches.
In order to do so, Schimmelfennig (2003, 167) proposes a sequencing
model of synthesis: “The synthetic institutionalist approach to the study of the
EU that I develop in this section develops on the rationalist assumptions of fixed
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preferences and the constructivist emphasis on the relevance of a cultural
env ironrnent of state action.”
Translated in the domain of international relations, this mode! starts with
the rational base of flxed preferences where actors use the rule-bounded
environment to manipulate (via the two processes of sharning and frarning defined
by Goffman) and incorporate the constructivist emphasis on the role ofnorms and
social constructs. Thus, actors within the internationa! community use and
manipulate the norms present within the community in order to prornote and
advance their own (fixed) interests. Schirnmelfennig (2003, 161) offers a
synthesis ofthis model:
To be sure, this synthesis cornes down heavily on the side of
rationalism. Institutions constrain the choices and behaviors of self
interested actors but do flot constitute their identity and interests.
Actors foltow a logic ofconsequentialism and do not necessarily learn
or internalize new preferences as a result oftheir interaction.
In order to illustrate the validity of this mode!, Schimmelfennig (2003)
applies different variations of the core mode! to the enlargement of two regional
international institutions: the EU and NATO. Ris objective is to explain the
process of enlargernent and the puzzle of enlargement. In short, while it is c!ear
that the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe had good reasons to
join the club of the EU and NATO, it is harder to understand the interests of the
Western European countries to accept these countries as full mernbers of the EU
and NATO club. Schimmelfennig argues that the key to the puzzle lies within the
interactions between states’ desire to maxirnize their interests and the impacts of
the liberal-dernocratic norrns that are present in the international environment. In
short, while a rationalist explanation can account for the desire of the Eastern
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European countries to join the EU and NATO, it is necessary to take into
consideration the normative element to understand the reasons why the West gave
in and enlarged the EU and NATO. Schimmelfennig (2003) argues that it is the
pressures made by the Eastern European states using as leverage the liberal
democratic norms that forced the enlargement. By framing the debate not as an
economic one but rather as one to reunite Europe and to enlarge the liberal
democratic community and by shaming the Western European countries that were
unwilling to enlarge using the normative argument, the Eastern European states
were able to impose these successive enlargements.
Concerning the design of international organizations
This model however does not specifically address the creation of these
institutions, the EU and NATO, and the outcomes of these successive
enlargements. On the one hand, the last point, outcomes, is in fact addressed:
since Schimmelfenning tries to explain why there was actually an enlargement,
the outcome is the actual enlargement. This however has limits. It looks only at
the immediate and most obvious outcome. The first element, the design of these
institutions, is flot addressed by Schimmelfenning (2003). This can be explained
by the fact that since the factors enabling enlargements are to be found in the
process of shaming and framing by particular states, an inside look at how
institutional design helped or hindered this process is not necessary. This is
somewhat problematic. As a flrst atternpt at theorizing Goffinann in IR,
Schimmelfenning’s case studies of EU and NATO are relevant. But at the same
time, reducing the causal explanation of these enlargements to a rational use of
norms limits the capacity to go beyond the short term outcorne.
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A logical extension ofthis rationalist framework embedded in a normative
environment would be a complementary view on the design of institutions. In
tum, by incorporating a conceptual model on the design of international
organizations, the short-term focus on the immediate outcomes is etiminated. This
is explained by the fact that by looking at the design, it is possible to study a range
of consequences, starting from the enlargement and moving forward to questions
of cooperation, issues addressed and increasing or decreasing impact and
relevance of the organization. However, for theoretical coherence, some
guidelines must be introduced in order to address both the design and the range of
possible consequences.
According to Schimmefeinning (2002, 2003), his theory applies a
sequencing model in which states are rational actors pursuing the maximization of
their interests but are embedded in a normative social environment which acts as a
tool or as a set of constraints regarding these national interests. Thus to be
consistent with this approach, a rationalist model of the design of international
organizations should be used.
Transforming this initial model first means to change the objective ofthe
modet from the study of external outcomes to the study of internal processes.
Making this analytical distinction does not change the model itself, only its
direction. The new direction of the model is the internal mechanism and
transformation of the international organization. The focus is on the way the
organization modifies itself in relation to the process of framing and shaming and
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flot only on the way these two processes shape the externai environment. In other
words, it introduces an intermediary step between the formation of states’ interests
and the externai impact of the rational use of norms by these states. It opens the
black box of international organizations by studying the impacts at different
stages of this rationai use ofnorms.
However, adapting the model to study the internai behaviour does not
mean that the externai outcomes are flot important. This adaptation simply
deepens the expianation of international organizations’ change. The outcome
phase remains important to look at, but primariiy as a consequence ofthe internai
transformation of the organization. As such, the externai outcome becomes
dependent on the internai transformation. Analytically, this means adding a path
dependent outcome to iink these two issues of internal change and externai
outcome the repeated interactions of members states within the organization
using the ftaming and shaming techniques reinforces the importance of these
techniques on the behaviour of states. The more states use framing and shaming,
the more difficuit it is for states to adopt new strategies of interaction. The more
framing and shaming is used, the more it produces two different outcornes: the
acceptation ofthe liberai democratic norms within the organization or the growing
tensions within the organization because of the conflictuai vision concerning
liberai democratic norms. Drawing from the degree of acceptation of conflict, it
is possible to expiain and analyze the outcomes on the organization relevance and
importance, ranging from full cooperation to total paralysis. Thus, the outcome
depends on the path used by members’ states to produce change within the
organization.
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To adapt Schirnmelfennig’s framcwork to the study of international
organizations’ change, two aspects must be developed. First, the mode! shouid
analyze the internai behaviour of states within the internationai organization and
focus on the different stages of the transformation proccss and flot focus soieiy on
immediate outcomes. In turn, this heips to understand the actuai evolution at each
stage of its development and to anaiyze the range of outcomes and possibilities
that exist within the organization at different moments of its existence. Secondiy,
the model can be completed by a path dependency factor. While the sequencing
part helps expiain the stages of the transformation, the path dependent part helps
understand its outcome. It thus makes the anaiytical connection between the step
by step transformation and the actua! outcome within the organization.
Presentation of the theoretical framework
The theoretical mode! used to understand the transformation of the OSCE
afier the Co!d War can be seen through three re!ated eiements: stages of
deve!opment, mechanisms and variables.
The mode! can be divided in three stages, the design phase, the
development phase and the outcome phase. In the first phase, members’ statcs
attempt to create an organization that fits with their rational interests and thus a
bargaining process is invoived amongst member’s states. In the second phase,
actors attempt to maximize their interests within the institutions by transforming
the institution. In the final stage, the impacts ofthe members’ states actions within
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the organization during the design and developrnent phases are assessed and
analyzed.
The independent variable is thus the behaviours ofthe members’ states and
the dependent variable is the change within the organization. The normative
environment serves as an intervening variable to understand the way the
behaviour ofrnembers’ states is shaped.
The two mechanisms that states use to influence the direction of the
organization and to maxirnize their interests are the process of frarning and
shaming in which states uses the normative environment in order to constrain
other actors in accepting the desired change or transformation. Thus, these
mechanisrns are the key elements that show the influence of the independent
variables on the change within the organization. A third rnechanism cornes into
play to understand the outcome phase, the path dependency process which also
rnakes the link between the independent and dependent variables.
Methodo]ogy
This section deals with the methodological issues involved in this study.
f irst, it explains the choice of the OSCE as the case study for this theoretical
model. The technique employcd, process-tracing, is then drawn for this case
study. The first part deals with the event selection and the second part deals with
how each sub case is studied in the sarne way to understand the process of
transformation using the theoretical model outlined above.
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Case seÏection
In order to test the validity of this theoreticai framework, this study
analyzes the transformation of the OSCE afier the Cold War. The case study of
the OSCE corresponds to a most-likely case of theory-testing (George and
Bennett 2005, 75). It is thus a good starting point to assess the preliminary validity
of the modet. First, the OSCE bas been one of the international organizations in
Europe that has adapted the most since the end of the Cold War. It has donc so in
part because its members are from Vancouver to Vladivostok, including ail the
post-communist countries ofthe former Soviet bloc are members. The diversity of
political regime in the OSCE area sets the tone for a piuraiity of conception
concerning the role of norms, the relevance of the OSCE and definition of
European security. Thus, the OSCE is an ideal place to study the emergence,
development and impacts of liberal democratic norms in the post-communist
transformations. Secondiy, the OSCE is part of the densest network of social
interactions, the European political arena’2 The OSCE bas ail the sufficient
conditions to bc cvaluated within this model and provides us with an analysis of
its transformation: massive transformation after 1990, different stages of change,
presence of liberal democratic countries, dernocratizing countries, and non-liberal
democratic countries and a dense network of social interactions.
Frocess tracing
Process tracing is defined as a “method [thatJ attempts to identii’ the
intervdning causal process
— the causal chain and causal mechanism
— between an
2 This argument is similar to the one used by Checkel et al (2005) in their study of international
socialization
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independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”
(George and Benneft 2005). As such, the objective is to identify the repertoire of
causal paths that Iink these set of variables together. In order to do so, each step of
the process must be consistent with the hypothesis (George and Bennett 2005).
For this study, an analytic explanation will be made using five events that
occurred within the OSCE between 1990 and 2005 in order to assess the validity
ofthe model. By selecting five distinct events, it is thus possible to understand the
three stages of the model (design, transformation and outcomes) and to provide
with enough evidence as to validate our hypothesis.
The five events that have been selected are as follow. For the design phase
ofthe model, the Second Helsinki Summit in 1992 will be analyzed. This summit
(that is a conference at the head of state level) marks the beginning of the
transformation ofthe OSCE and offers an interesting picture ofthe OSCE before
its redesign. For the second phase ofthe model, two events will be analyzed. f irst,
the security model process ofLisbon between 1994 and 1996 will be analyzed to
evaluate the first steps of this transformation. The second event will be the
negotiations leading up to and the Istanbul Summit of 1999. This event marks the
end of the transformation process and the beginning of the third stage. It is also
the last summit of the OSCE. Two events will be used to analyze the ongoing
crisis, the outcome phase: the budget crisis between 2003 and 2005 and the panel
ofeminent persons on strengthening the effectiveness ofthe OSCE, 2004-2006.
64
Phase Events —
Stage I: Design — Charter of Paris Helsinki-II —
1990 1992
Stage II: Development — Security Model Istanbul Summit —
1994-1996 1999
Stage III: Outcomes — Budget crisis Panel of eminent —
200 1-2006 persons 2004-
2006
Each case will be drawn in exactly the same way in order to measure the
impacts of the independent and intervening variables as well as providing the
background for an understanding ofthe causal mechanisms.
f irst, a summary of the event will be sketched. The next part will provide
the necessary theoretical information concerning the stage, the variables and the
expected logic ofthe event. The third section will consist ofthe exptanation ofthe
members’ states behaviour (independent variable), the role of the liberal
democratic environment (intervening variable) and the consequences on the
OSCE (dependent variable). The final section gives a surnmary of the key
elements and assess the relationship between the sub case and the theoretical
model.
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Chapter III
Transforming the OSCE- Empirical Evidence13
The objectives of this chapter are to test the theoretical framework
described in the previous chapter and, in the concluding section, to assess its
merits and limits and push the research agenda in new directions. In order to do
so, this chapter is divided in four sections. The first three sections mirror the three
stages defined in the model: design, development and outcomes phases, while the
last one discusses the way forward.
f ive distinct events or chain of events will be analyzed to provide the
empirical evidence. For the design phase, the period between 1990 and 1992, and
most importantly the Charter of Paris in 1990 and the Second Helsinki Summit in
1992, will serve as the main analytical element. For the development phase, the
construction ofthe Security Model leading to the Istanbul Summit and the Charter
for European Security will be studied. As such, this phase will look at the period
between 1994, after the Budapest Summit, and 1999, the last OSCE Summit in
Istanbul. Again, two central events will be the focus of this section: the Lisbon
Summit, 1996, and Istanbul Summit. The third and final stage will be studied
from a different angle. Since there have been no OSCE summits after 1999, the
outcomes of the first two stages vi11 be studied using two ongoing debates within
the OSCE. The first one is the budget crisis that has plagued the organization
since 2001. The second one is the debate on new reforms within the OSCE aller
‘ A detailed list of OSCE archive documents used in this study is avaitable from the author, the
technical nature and the large amount ofcited documents made it hard to include the references in
text for this article
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the Istanbul Summit, but the focus wiIl be on the debates leading to and following
the panel ofeminent persons on strengthening the effectiveness ofthe OSCE.
The last section puts these three elements in a comparative perspective for
two purposes: give a broad view ofthe way the OSCE was transformed during the
I 990s and provide a point of departure for new research on the role of states and
norms within international organizations.
From the Charter of Paris to Helsinki-II: The creation of a new normative
environment
Two documents have marked the end ofthe Cold War period: the OSCE’s
Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 and, before that, the London
Declaration by NATO stating that the members ofthe Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
Union are flot adversaries anymore. The Charter of Paris reiterated the principtes
ofihe Helsinki fmal Act and, under the heading “A new era ofDemocracy, Peace
and Unity”, paved the way for the development of a liberal democratic
environment in Europe, broadly defined. As such, two objectives were behind this
Charter. The first was the necessity to state and affirm that a new era had begun
and that the principles ofthe f mal Act were stiil relevant in this new environment.
In short, the Charter laid the normative foundations of this new security
landscape. The second objective was to start the (re) design ofthe OSCE in order
to account for the new realities of the post-Cold War era and to develop new
structures that would be able to preserve the foundations ofthis new ilberal order.
Thus, a Secretariat was established in Prague to assist the Council of Senior
Officiais (CSO) in the administrative duties and to help set a plan for the review
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of the OSCE structures, mandates and activities that would take pLace two years
afier in Helsinki. In the same vein, two new institutions were created to assure that
the normative foundations of this new cnvironment would be preserved. The
Office for free Elections (Warsaw, renamed Office for democratic institutions
and human rights, ODIHR) and the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC, Vienna)
were established to help with the democratization process following the end ofthe
Cold War and to assist in monitoring potential conflict situations and to prevent
those situations.
Two years afier, the Helsinki Summit began in an entirely different seiling.
While thc events of 1989-1990 seerned to pave the way for an era of democracy,
peace and unity, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the outbrcak of war in the
Balkans and new conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-soviet
countries reminded the OSCE’s participating states that much effort vas stili
needed to create a peaceful European environment. Three elements stand out of
this Summit and the document appropriately namcd The challenge ofchanges: the
continued process of institutionalization, the responses to the new security
environment and the normative foundations of the OSCE. (Heraclides 1993;
Bloed 1994)
f irst, Helsinki-11 continued the development of new structures and
activities that started with the Charter of Paris. The final decisions expanded the
mandates of the OFE and renamed it ODIHR and the CPC was also given new
functions, notably conceming the Peaceful Settiements of Disputes. The decision
making body, the CSO, also saw its role increased. Yet, it is the creation of the
6$
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) that seems to be the centraL
elernent of this institutionalization process. The HCNM is an instrument of
conflïct prevention and helps to diffuse and de-escalate ethnic tensions and serves
as an early-warning procedure (Heraclides 1993; Bloed 1994).
Secondly, Helsinki-II conflrmed the impression of a gap between the
OSCE’s development and the chain ofevents that unfolded rapidly in Europe. As
such, the OSCE was clearly reflecting the day-to-day evolution of the security
environment in Europe. While the Charter of Paris is based on an optimistic view
of the future, “Challenge of changes” is marked with a much more pessimistic
view. The attempt to create a peacekeeping force within the structure ofthe OSCE
and the position of many participating states that wanted to focus on the politico
military dimension ofthe fmal Act also showed the way the OSCE reacted to the
European conflicts. The rapid pace of the political pressures and new emerging
threats in Europe thus clearly limited the ability of the OSCE to adapt and to
fulfiul the expectations of its incomplete (re) design. Related to this problem was
the necessity to deal with other security forums such as NATO that also placed the
newly designed OSCE institution in competition with other structures and thus
limited the efficiency ofthe institutionalization process.
Finally, it is possible to undcrstand the process of institutionalization that
took place in 1992 as a way to refocus the European security environment towards
the Helsinki-principles.
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Reforming the OSCE: The evolution of the Security Mode! and the Istanbul
Summit
In order to respond to the ongoing chain of events in Europe’4 and also to
implement structural reforrns within the OSCE to clarify its roles, functions and
objectives, the Organization changed its name in 1995 from the CSCE to the
OSCE. As part of these structural reforms, the participating states agreed on
defining a new organizational mode! for the OSCE. Thus started in 1994 the
Security Mode! Committee, which objective was to ana!yze the potential of the
OSCE in the European security architecture and to propose new ways for the
OSCE to adapt and work in this new sccurity environment. Yet, participating
states themselves differed on what they wanted the OSCE to achieve. On the one
hand, sorne states, including the Russian Federation, wanted to transform the
OSCE as a fully-fledged legal international organization and to make it the central
pillar of European security. On the other hand, the United States did not find the
organization to be fully relevant and wanted to keep the OSCE 10w-profile and go
with NATO as the central institution in Europe. In the middle, the European
Union argued for a balanced approach where the OSCE should find a niche within
the security field, namely as a promoter of liberal democratic norms (Ghébali
1996; Plate 1999).
The way the discussions on this new mode! appeared highlights the
process of rhetorical action. At the first meeting of the subcommittee, the Russian
federation produced a complete drafi of what it wanted the Security Mode! to be.
14 The successive disintegrations ofthe USSR and Yugoslavia and the conflicts that emerged from
these disintegrations are considered by most OSCE analysts to have had a critical importance
(especially the Baikans war, the Kosovo crisis and the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space) (
Ghébali 1996 ; Kemp 2001)
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The Russian Federation promoted its ideas by relating them to the Helsinki norms.
In short, the Russian Federation attempted to frame the debates as one about the
future of democracy and stability in Europe. Throughout the two years discussion
ofthe commiftee, this was the approach ofthe Russian federation and other post
Soviet states: to promote their security interests by framing the debate and
shaming the Western members in acquiescing to their demands. This strategy
however did flot fully work. First, the United States were fully opposed to an
increase of mandate and power of the OSCE while some Europeans countries
(with france leading) were willing to accept a legal framework for the OSCE, but
flot much more. The framing and shaming strategies had some, albeit limited,
success in that at the Lisbon Summit of 1996 the Security Model document was
adopted, though with only minor structural reforms and no new legal status for the
organization. In short, white the security situation had dramatically changed since
1990 and 1992, the Security Model did little to provide a relevant working
platform for the OSCE (Schneider 199$).
The compromise achieved in Lisbon was only temporary and did flot
satisfy any states. In response to what rnany post-Soviet states perceived as an
imbalance between the three dimensions, with a focus on the human dimension,
these states demanded that the OSCE should focus on ail three dimensions
(human, politico-military and economic) equaliy. In order to promote these ideas,
the post-Soviet countries attempted to shame the Western countries by affirming
that the imbalances present within the organization did not foster democratization
and the implementation of liberal democratic norms in their countries. These
repeated atternpts started in 1997 and led to a renewed attempt by the OSCE to
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renegotiate its functions and roles. Yet this time, the European Union and the
United States aiso attempted to frame the debate as one concerning the foie ofthe
Russian Federation in its near neighborhood. Their main argument is that the role
of the Russian federation in the so-caiied frozen conflicts was cieariy negative
and that in order to respect the Helsinki principies; Russia should remove its
troops from the region, especiaiiy Georgia.
In short, between 1997 and 1999, a new round of negotiations started that
involved two sides attempting to frame the debates in their own favorable terms
and to shame the other in acquiescing to their dernands. This, again, resuited in a
new document at the Istanbul Summit of 1999, the Charter for European Security.
This document was seen as a limited (Ghébali 2001) success as it forced the
Russian Federation to dismantie most of its military bases in Georgia in the
following years, yct the document does flot contain new ideas for the
transformation ofthe OSCE and only reiterates what had been done in Lisbon.
From stagnation to open crisis — The poiitics of reform within the OSCE
The repeated framing and sharning struggies within the OSCE eventualiy
ied to unintended consequences that, reiated to our theoretical framework, can be
iinked to a path dependency process. In short, after the Istanbul Summit, the
organization was not abie to push through some much needed reforms and due to
the differences of intercsts between the participating states, a period of stagnation
started and the OSCE couid flot manage efficiently its activities. The stagnation
process can be iilustrated in the ongoing budget debates of the organization in
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which the absence of consensus within the participating states eventually led, in
2004 and 2005, to a budget being adopted at the last minute, almost stopping in
2005 the activities ofthe OSCE, except for the administrative tasks and long term
missions (Ghébali 2002; 2005).
The crisis process can be seen in light of the repeated struggles as the
failed reform attempts, combined with the repeated framing and shaming games,
led to an open-crisis within the OSCE. This crisis can be seen in two steps. The
tirs element can be located in the Moscow Declaration of July 3, 2004 and
repeated in the Astana Appeal of September 15, 2004 made by the Russian
federation and some CIS countries in which they denounced the imbalanccs of
the organization and mention clearly that the OSCE will lose its interests and its
relevance if no important reform is done (Bloed 2004; Barry 2004). The answer to
this was thc creation of a panel of eminent persons on strengthening the OSCE
launched in 2005. Their recommendations made public in June 2005 still highlight
the gaps between the different blocs15 within the organization and the techniques
used by these blocs to promote their interests (Vandemoortele 2006).
It is possible to see that the repeated attempts at framing and shaming the
roles and functions ofthe OSCE by the various participating states, especially the
European Union and, subsequently the Rtissian Federation, hindered and limited
the institutionalization ofthe OSCE. Ibis reflects the hypothesis on the impacts of
rhetorical action in the case where norms are not internalized and are use to
manipulate: an (almost) total paralysis.
‘ Bloed (2004) argues that the CIS countries and the Western states ofthe OSCE are drawing up
new unes and forming blocs that are simitar to the former East-West divide.
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The way forward
In the end, it is possible to single out other factors that influcnced the
transformation of the OSCE such as the distribution of power, the domestic
politics of the participating states or the division of labor between the different
security organizations in Europe. However, these factors can be embedded in the
broader theoretical model used here. In short, the name of the game is rhetorical
action under a strategic context: the participating states did cverything they can
(but rnostly framing and shaming tactics) to promote their security interests by
manipulating the liberal dernocratic norms that formed the core of the OSCE and
ofthe Helsinki principles. The process of transformation ofthe OSCE can be seen
as a challenge for the spread of democracy as democratic norms were not fully
internalized by ail participating states, but instead merely used as part of a logic of
consequentiality. Furthcr rcscarch on the relationship between international
organizations, security and democracy is thus needed to see if the OSCE is an
exception or the tip ofthe iceberg. (Epstein 2005; Gheciu 2005; Reiter 2001)
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Conclusion
Using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as
a case study, this project presented a model for understanding both the
institutional design and the subsequent transformations of international
organizations (IGOs). This mode! derives ftom a body of literature on the
strategic manipulation of norms most recently exemplified by the work of Frank
Schimmelfenning. By presenting a mode! that takes into account the different
phases of the life cycle of an 1GO, this paper argues that the key point to our
understanding ofIGOs lies in the struggie for power and influence that is reflected
in the processes of shaming and framing, under the notion of rhetorical action, by
members states. In the case of the OSCE, different conceptions of the rules and
principles of the Helsinki fmal Act lcd the participating states in rhetorical
arguments that culminated in what, following a path dependent process, can be
labelled as unintended consequences, namely the actual political crisis and
stalernate within the organization. Although this model more clearly applies to
security institutions and gives us a detailed understanding of their interna!
rnechanisms, use of this model could also provide with beffer knowledge of non
security related institutions where a consensus does not exist on the normative
foundations within the organization.
Chapter I provided a literature review that focused both on studies donc on
the OSCE and, more broadly, on theories of international organizations. Two
elements clearly stood out. First, the literature on the OSCE has given little
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attention to theoretical debates, instead concentrating on analysis that described
what the OSCE is or attempted to discuss what it should be. The volume of
descriptive research gives us a better factuat understanding of the OSCE, but does
flot enable us to understand the underlying causes ofthe state ofthe OSCE and its
many transformations foltowing the end of the Cold War. Turning to the few
studies that addressed the OSCE on theoretical grounds, I found that the debates
are dom inated by a strong constrtictivist premise.
Chapter II made explicit the elements found in the literature review and
asked several questions on what we know about the OSCE and what we shouÏd try
to know. This was foliowed by the presentation of the main puzzle through an
evaluation of the gaps in the literature. In short, three main gaps exist in the
theoretical literature on the OSCE a time frame that encompasses the whole
period since the end of the Cold War (1990-2006), a specific analysis on the
internai impacts of the normative basis of the OSCE (since most of the
constructivist studies deal with the external impacts of the OSCE norms and do
not render explicit their daims about the origins of these norms) and a focus on
the dimension of power within the organization (since most research focused on
normative aspects and assurned that power does not play a significant role in an
1GO that works within a consensus framework ofdecision-making). The puzzle is
a simple one. If the CSCE, as many studies have recently argued (Thomas 2001),
played a key role in the demise of communism and if its role was essential to
navigate the transition to a post-Cold War period, why has the OSCE failed to live
up to its potential after 1995?
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The remainder of Chapter II was used to discuss the main hypothesis, its
operationalization and the mode! used to make the demonstration. It is argued that
the deliberate and strategic manipulation of the !iberat democratic norms by the
different participating states within the OSCE, through the process of rhetorica!
action, flot only defined its role an identity, but it a!so had the consequence of
recreating new dividing unes within this organization and thus provide the
background for the ongoing crisis within the OSCE. In order to prove this, the
participating states ‘behaviours is used as the independent variable and the change
within the organization is the dependent variable. The normative environment was
used as an intervening variable to contextua!ize these dynamics. To understand
the impact of the participating states on the transformation of the OSCE, The
focus is specifical!y on the processes of shaming and framing, both actions
intended to strategica!!y manipu!ate the normative foundations ofthe environment
in order to advance the states ‘interests.
The mode! itse!fwas separated in three stages: the design, the deve!opment
and the outcomes. Each stage of the mode! was used to present a coherent and
complete view ofthe transformation ofthe OSCE. The design stage is associated
with the period between 1990 and 1992, during which time the participating states
redefined the ro!es and functions of the OSCE and cernented the normative
foundations through the Charter for a new Europe and the Helsinki — II Summit,
respectively in 1990 and 1992. The development stage is the centra! e!ement as it
is during this period that rhetorical actions mostly occur. To illustrate these
processes, this section focused on two debates concerning the future ro!e and
identity ofthe OSCE, the Security Model debates between 1994 and 1996 and the
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debates leading to the Istanbul Summit and the Charter for European Security in
1999. The final stage centers around the notion of path dependency where the
shaming and framing mechanisms have a powerful influence on the political
direction of the organization. To show the extent and the causes of the political
crisis within the organization, an analysis of both (j) the budget crisis that started
in 2001 and (ii) the chain of events around the panel of eminent persons on
strengthening the effectiveness and the relevance of the OSCE between 2004 and
2006 was made.
Chapter III is the empirical demonstration of the model constructed in the
previous chapter. It looked at the threc different stages presented in the theoreticai
model. This provided a better empirical understanding of the internai
transformations ofthe OSCE and its external impacts. In the design phase, T tried
to show the importance of the normative foundations of the OSCE, through the
reaffirmation both in 1990 and 1992 of the essential roles of the Helsinki fmal
Act principles. This part follows a classical constructivist argument on the rote
played by norms in international relations. In the development stage, the notion of
rhetorical action is introduced to illustrate this rnechanism by drawing on the
processes of framing and shaming. On the debates concerning the Security
Model, it was argued that the EU, along with the United States and Canada,
mostly relied on shaming and framing techniques centred on liberal democratic
norms to force its conceptions of the OSCE identity. In the end, the Security
Model adopted in Lisbon in 1996 reflected, in large parts, the Western states ideas
of the OSCE. On the Charter for European Security, the Russian Federation
attempted again to impose its own vision of the OSCE by attempting to frame the
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debates on the development of politico-military and economic issues rathcr than
those concerning human rights. These atternpts were however countered by the
EU who insisted on a different frame of reference and the Charter for European
Security mostly reaffirms the values and principles ofthe Helsinki fmal Act and
does flot constitute in itself a step forward for the organization. In the outcome
stage, an illustration of the consequences of this particular development was
drawn. f irst, this showed that by forcing a particular frame of reference within the
OSCE, the EU and its western allies have alienated a rnajority of post-soviet
states. This also highlighted the responses to this imposed conception, mainly
through the Astana appeal and the Moscow Declaration in 2004 where most CIS
countries denounced the situation as one that does not offer any beneffi to them
and that this frame of reference was unacceptable. This led to the dual budget
crisis and the actual reform attempts between 2001 and 2006.
The main argument is that, contrary to common assertions, the EU failed
to integrate the post-Soviet states into a security cornrnunity founded on a
common identity and a common set of values and norms. Instead, during the
development ofthe OSCE in the 1990s the EU simply forced its own conceptions
by maniputating its normative foundations and did flot attcmpt to create a sense of
common purpose. This eventually led to a political crisis within the organization.
This view reflects the notion that norms were strategically manipulated and flot
integrated as part of a logic of appropriateness. Yet, this model could be
improved by focusing more on the questions ofpower and influence (Bamett and
Duval 2005). This would prove useful in making explicit the efficiency of the
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framing and shaming techniques by looking at the context and the strengths of
different participating states.
f inally, this study presents several interesting findings on both the OSCE
and IGOs in general. First, related to the OSCE, it highlights the foot causes ofthe
actual political crisis. By focusing on norms and the behaviours of participating
states in a complex dynamic, this project brings forward both the political nature
of the crisis and the normative dilemma it poses. As such, this has a clear policy
oriented value by pointing on where to look to reform the organization. By doing
this, this study challenges some of the recommendations made by the panel of
eminent persons (mainly those that deal with reforming the consensus rules), but
it also agrees with their most thoughtful suggestion: to raise the level ofawareness
towards the organization and to capitalize on the power of public diplomacy.
Related to our understanding of IGOs, The model used here points to fruitful
research directions, in particular by focusing on the complete life cycle of IGOs.
It also redirects the focus of studies on IGOs towards their normative foundations
and could make a valuable contribution to the study of contested IGOs where
there is no clear consensus on the principles, roles or direction of the specific
1GO.
vi
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Annex I
List of OSCE Documents
The OSCE documents are available onhine (http://www.osce.org/documents/ ),
unless thcy are restricted. However, the actual codification of OSCE Documents
only starts in 1994. Therefore, any documents created before 1994 has not yet
been codified according to the actuat OSCE system and are Iikely not to be found
online. This list mentions only the primary documents used for this study. It does
flot include the speeches, comments and other decisions made during the annual
Ministerial Councils. The amount of documents used from these sources
prevented us from including them in this annex. These documents can be found
in several consoÏidated documents cahled the OSCE Ministerial Council fmal
Documents. The sarne apphies for the Summits (1990-1999)
(http://www.osce.org/mc/l3017.htm1 ). f inally, the decisions made by the OSCE
are available in the OSCE Annual reports (http://www.osce.org/pubIications )
Again, the large quantity of relevant OSCE decisions to our study was too
important to be presented here.
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PC.IFC/24/00 Restr. REF.PC/703/95
SEC.GAL/1 36/99 REF.PC/7 10/95 Restr
PC.IFC/66/98 Restr., REF.PC/701/95 Restr
SEC.GAL/79/98 Restr PC.DEL 709 2002
PC.DEL/439/9$/Rev. 1
SEC.GAL/19/98 Restr., European Security Model
PC.IfC/21/9$ Restr.,
PC.IFC/25/98 Restr PC.DEL/38$/99
PC.DEL/J 67/98 PC.DEL/389/99
PC .IFC/3 0/98 Restr PC .DEL/3 94/99
REf.PC/638/97 PC.DEL/397/99
REf.PC/5 79/97 Restr. PC .DEL/3 90/99 Restr
REf.PC/580/97 Restr PC.DEL/387/99
PC.DEL/391/99
Central Asia PC.DEL/392/99
PC.DEL/396/99
CIO.GAL/61/99 Restr PC.DEL/393/99
PC.DEL/356/99 PC.DEL/395/99
PC.DEL/361/99 PC.DEL/495/98
PC.DEL/365/99 PC.DEL/492/98
PC.DEL/470/9$ PC.DEL/494/98
PC.DEL/405/98 PC.DEL/493/98 Restr
PC.DEL/49$/98
Economic Dimension PC.DEL/497/98 Restr
PC.DEL/500/98
PC.DEL/336/05 PC.DEL/499/98
PC .DEL/345/05 PC .DEL/496/98 Restr
SEC.GAL/5$/05 OSCE PC.DEL/464/98
PC.DEL/145/05 PC.DEL/468/98
PC .DEL/1 56/05 PC .DEL/3 34/98 Restr
xx
SEC .GAL/5 0/98 Restr PC.DEL/ 104/04
PC.DEL/330/98 Restr PC.DEL/$8/04
PC.DEL/329/98 PC.DEL/101/04
PC.DEL/333/98
PC.DEL/336/98 Terrorism
PC.DEL/339/98 Restr
PC.DEL/340/98 PC.DEC/6 17
PC.DEL/341/98 Restr SEC.GAL/27/04 OSCE+
PC.DEL/33 5/98 Restr PC.DEL/1 3 76/03/Rev. 1
PC.DEL/3 31/98 Restr PC.DEL/1 3 $8/03
PC.DEL/342/98 PC.DEL/1 394/03
PC.DEL/332/9$ Restr SEC.GAL/207/03 Restr
PC .DEL/3 38/9 $ Restr SEC .GAL/ 164/03 Restr.
PC.DEL/33 7/98 SEC.GAL/1 55/03 Restr.
CIO.GAL/49/02 Restr
PC.DEL/95/9$ Restr PC.DEL/47$/02
PC.DEL/98/98 PC.DEL/473/02
PC .DEL/ 106/98 PC .DEL/476/02 Restr
PC .DEL/ 100/98 PC .DEL/482/02/Corr. 1
PC.DEL/1 05/98 PC.DEL/4$0/02
PC.DEL/99/9$ PC.DEL/485/02
PC.DEL/108/98 PC.DEL/483/02
PC.DEL/1 07/98 PC.DEL/484/02
PC.DEL/109/9$ PC.DEL/4$6/02
PC.DEL/1 10/98 PC.DEL/454/02
PC.DEL/1 12/98 PC.DEL/443/02)
PC.DEC/22 I CIO.GAL/1 9/02
CIO.GAL/4/98 Restr. ODIHR.GAL/20/02/Corr. I
PC.SMC/24/97 Restr FOM.GAL/6/02
PC.SMC/19/97 Restr PA.GAL/3/02
PC.SMC/21/97), PC.DEL/241/02
PC. SMC/1 7/97 Restr PC .DEL/262/02
PC.SMC/32/97 Restr PC.DEL/250/02
PC.SMC/31/97 Rcstr PC.DEL/259/02
PC. SMC/25/97 Restr PC .DEL/267/02 Restr.
PC.SMC/22/97 Restr PC.DEL/263/02
PC.SMC/28/97), PC.DEL/255/02
PC. SMC/1 8/97 Restr PC .DEL/254/02
PC.SMC/27/97 Restr PC.DEL/266/02
PC.SMC/30/97 PC.DEL/257/02
PC. SMC/20/97 Restr PC.DEL/25 8/02
PC.SMC/29/97 PC.DEL/253/02
PC.SMC/23/97 PC.DEL/261/02
PC.SMC/26/97 Restr CIO.GAL/21/02
PC.DEC/1 63 PC.DEL/2 13/02
PC.DEC/65 SEC. GAL/35/02
SEC.GAL/36/02
Human rights dimension PC.DEL/710/01
CIO.GAL/45/0 I
PC.DEL/92/04 PC.DEL/696/01 Restr
xxi
PC.DELI6$6/01 PC.DEL/55$/O1
PC.DEL/694/0 1 CIO.GAL/32/0 1 Restr.
PC.DEL/695/0 1
SEC.GAL/172/01 Stability Pact
PC.DEL/656/O 1
PC.DEL/659/O1 PC.DEL/302/01
PC.DEL/648/0 1 PC.DEL/294/O 1
PC.DEL/647/O 1 PC.DEL/309/0 1
PC.DEL/291 2004 REF.PC/406/95
REf.PC/566/96 Restr. REF.PC/401/95 Restr
Relevance of the OSCE
CIO.GAL/50/O 1
PC.DEL/737/0 1
PC.DEL/748/0 I
PC.DEL/736/0 I
PC.DEL/738/O 1
PC.DEL/735/0 1
PCDEL/747/0 1
PC.DEL/732/0 1
PC.DEL/734/0 1
PC.DEL/750/0 1
PC.DEL/743/0 1
PC.DEL/740/0 I
PC.DEL/746/0 I
PC .DEL/745/0 1
PC.DEL/744/0 1
PC.DEL/733/0 1
PC.DEL/75 5/01
PC.DEL/697/0 I
PC.DEL/698/0 1
PC.DEL/699/0 1
PC.DEL/700/0 I
PC.DEL/70 1/01
PC.DEL/702/0 1
PC.DEL/706/01/Rev. 1
PC.DEL/753/0 1
PC.DEL/749/0 1
PC.DEL/75 1/01
PC.DEL/754/0 1
SEC.GAL/200/0 1
PC.DEL/37$/0 1
PC.DEL/39 1/01
PC.DEL/376/0 1
PC.DEL/375/01 Restr.
PC .DEL/3 $2/01
PC.DEL/390/0 1
PC.DEL/379/0 I
CIO.GAL/26/0 1 Restr.
